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More than two decades ago, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
(“TVPA”) established new, robust protections for immigrant victims of 
trafficking. In particular, Congress created the T visa to protect immigrant 
victims from deportation. Since 2000, however, the annual cap of 5,000 T 
visas has never been reached. Fewer than 1,100 T visas have ever been 
granted annually to immigrant victims. In the last five years, approval 
rates also have plummeted. Of the T visa cases adjudicated for victims 
annually, only 57.21% were approved in fiscal year 2020, compared with 
71.88% in fiscal year 2015. These developments came as former President 
Donald J. Trump, like many presidents before him, proclaimed a deep 
commitment to end the “epidemic” of human trafficking and to protect 
“innocent” victims. 
 
Though scholars have critiqued the general protection framework 
for immigrant victims of trafficking, this article unearths an understudied 
problem: the often unseen role of the “shallow state.” In contrast to the 
much-discussed “deep state” of career bureaucrats, this article suggests 
that low-level administrative actors adjudicating humanitarian 
immigration cases have subtly worked to erode protections for immigrant 
victims of trafficking. This article demonstrates how such actors have 
creatively engaged in a range of tactics, including delay, rejection, and 
heightened stakes, to contort the T visa application process and make it 
more difficult for immigrant victims to navigate successfully. The article 
explores how these actions—often diffuse and obscured—have been hard 
to identify or to subject to judicial review. It warns that these bureaucratic 
tendencies could erode protections for immigrant victims of trafficking for 
years to come. It thus prescribes not only greater attention to such 
practices, but also administrative and judicial remedies. 
  
 
* Clinical Associate Professor and Director of the Immigrants’ Rights and Human 
Trafficking Program, Boston University School of Law. Many thanks to Jane Aiken, Cori 
Alonso-Yoder, Warren Binford, Daniel Kanstroom, Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Lori 
Nessel, Faraz Sanei, and Rachel Wechsler for insightful comments. I greatly appreciate the 
feedback received from the NYU Clinical Law Review Writing Workshop. I am 
immensely grateful to Brian Flaherty, Samantha Lerner, and Johanna Greenberg for their 
excellent research assistance. All errors are my own. 
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To mark the twentieth anniversary of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act (“TVPA”), former President Donald J. Trump hosted a 
White House summit on human trafficking.1 He announced unequivocally: 
“My administration is 100 percent committed to eradicating human 
trafficking from the Earth.”2 He reminded the audience that “[w]e’ve had a 
tremendous track record—the best track record in a long time.”3 He then 
proudly proclaimed how his Administration had passed nine pieces of 
anti-trafficking legislation, authorized $430 million to fight trafficking, 
and withheld foreign aid from countries that failed to sufficiently fight 
trafficking.4  
Former President Trump’s summit was not simply a public 
relations stunt. The Trump Administration, like many Republican and 
Democratic administrations before it, repeatedly insisted that ending 
human trafficking was a major foreign policy priority and committed to 
 
1 Remarks by President Trump at the White House Summit on Human Trafficking: The 
20th Anniversary of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, TRUMP WHITE 
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protect “innocent” victims.5 In fact, former President Trump gained 
notoriety when he controversially proclaimed that trafficking is “[w]orse 
than ever at any time in the history of our world”6 and promised to bring 
the full force of the U.S. government to bear on the problem.7 This he did 
at times albeit in a rather cynical, Machiavellian way, by using trafficking 
to justify broad executive actions aimed at immigration enforcement.8 
 
5 See e.g., WHITE HOUSE, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION IS COMMITTED TO COMBATING 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND PROTECTING THE INNOCENT (Oct. 20, 2020), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/trump-administration-committed-
combating-human-trafficking-protecting-innocent/ [https://perma.cc/FZ2F-GCG5] 
(quoting former President Trump as stating, “We renew our resolve to redouble our 
efforts to deliver justice to all who contribute to the cruelty of human trafficking, and will 
tenaciously pursue the promise of freedom for all victims of this terrible crime.”); see 
also Remarks in a Meeting on Human Trafficking at the Mexico-United States Border 
and an Exchange With Reporters, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 48 (Feb. 1, 2019); 
WHITE HOUSE, REMARKS BY PRESIDENT TRUMP AT THE WHITE HOUSE SUMMIT ON 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING: THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS 
PROTECTION ACT OF 2000, (Jan. 31, 2020) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-white-house-summit-human-trafficking-20th-
anniversary-trafficking-victims-protection-act-2000/ [https://perma.cc/25HX-4E62]; 
Rebecca Ballhaus, Trump Strengthens Efforts Against Human Trafficking, Amid 
Criticism from Victims’ Advocates, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-strengthens-efforts-against-human-trafficking-amid-
criticism-from-victims-advocates-11580482657 [https://perma.cc/Y3U6-TRVL] (quoting 
President Trump, who proclaimed that his administration “will not rest until we’ve 
stopped every last human trafficker and liberated every last survivor”).  
6 WHITE HOUSE, REMARKS BY PRESIDENT TRUMP AT THE WHITE HOUSE SUMMIT ON 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING supra note 1. President Trump’s statement that trafficking was 
“worse” than any other time was heavily criticized by scholars and activists who 
remarked that there is no evidence to support this assertion. See e.g., Aaron Blake, Trump 
says human trafficking ‘is worse than it’s ever been in the history of the world.’ Where to 
begin?, WASH. POST (April 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2018/04/19/trump-says-human-trafficking-is-worse-than-its-ever-been-in-the-
history-of-the-world-where-to-even-begin/ [https://perma.cc/VXB4-KDXN] (noting that 
this “seems this is one of those facts that nobody else knew — because it’s not true”); 
Daniella Diaz, Trump says human trafficking is ‘worse now than it ever was,’ CNN (July 
28, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/28/politics/donald-trump-human-
trafficking/index.html [https://perma.cc/JU5K-TYSR] (citing to statistics related to 
African slavery to argue that, while human trafficking is a serious problem, it is certainly 
not “worse” than it has ever been).  
7 WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP HAS MADE IT A PRIORITY TO COMBAT 
THE HEINOUS CRIME OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-made-
priority-combat-heinous-crime-human-trafficking/ [https://perma.cc/6D4C-YM6G] (“My 
Administration is committed to leveraging every resource we have to confront this threat, 
to support the victims and survivors, and to hold traffickers accountable for their heinous 
crimes.”). 
8 President Trump used trafficking as a justification for wide scale immigration 
enforcement efforts, which had the impact of separating hundreds of immigrant families, 
criminally prosecuting immigrants who entered the country unlawfully, and dismantling 
asylum protections. See, e.g., Julie Dahlstrom, The Elastic Meaning(s) of Human 
Trafficking, 108 CAL. L. REV. 379, 433 (2020) (citing Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, 
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When advocates opined that such efforts would imperil protections for 
immigrant victims,9 he reassured victims: “You are not alone.”10  
Yet immigrant victims of human trafficking in the United States 
had never felt so alone. Prominent anti-trafficking advocates boycotted the 
White House Summit on Human Trafficking.11 They called the former 
President’s anti-trafficking rhetoric a “public deception.”12 Advocates 
 
Addresses Recent Criticisms of Zero Tolerance By Church Leaders (June 14, 2018) 
(examining how President Trump used trafficking as a sword to fuel immigration 
enforcement efforts with serious collateral consequences)). 
9 This article uses the term “victim” throughout because it is a term of legal significance. 
Many have argued that the term “victim” is problematic, as it characterizes individuals by 
weakness or passivity, rather than by strength or courage. See, e.g., Martha Minow, 
Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1432 (1993) (“Victimhood is a cramped 
identity, depending on and reinforcing the faulty idea that a person can be reduced to a 
trait. The victim is helpless, decimated, pathetic, weak, and ignorant. Departing from this 
script may mean losing whatever entitlements and compassion victim status may 
afford.”); Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in 
Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157, 160 (2007) (discussing the 
iconic trafficking victim as “meek, passive objects of sexual exploitation … exercising no 
free will during their illegal entry” and suggesting this rhetoric has become a myth to 
lawmakers and law enforcement agents). However, this article uses the term victim in 
place of “survivor” because it is a legal term of art that allows individuals to access 
important protections, including but not limited to immigration status, public benefits, 
civil damages, and criminal restitution. See Amanda Peters, Reconsidering Federal and 
State Obstacles to Human Trafficking Victim Status and Entitlements, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 
535, 539 (2016) (“In the human trafficking context, victims receive much more than mere 
attention by wearing the label [of victim]; they earn legal rights, services, benefits, and 
freedom from criminal charges.”). 
10 Trump to trafficking victims: You are not alone, CNN (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/04/11/trump-signs-sex-trafficking-act.cnn 
[https://perma.cc/4DT2-ECU8]. 
11 See, e.g., Jessica Contrera, Anti-human-trafficking groups refuse to attend Ivanka 
Trump’s White House summit, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/human-trafficking-groups-refuse-to-attend-
ivanka-trumps-white-house-summit/2020/01/29/6410de32-41d4-11ea-b503-
2b077c436617_story.html [https://perma.cc/B9WR-MJ6E]; Katie Rogers, White House 
Holds Trafficking ‘Summit,’ but Critics Dismiss Lack of Dialogue, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/politics/trump-trafficking.html 
[https://perma.cc/5WX6-VH83] (“[T]he White House event, which lasted the better part 
of two hours, did nothing to ease the concerns of activists who have said the 
administration’s previous efforts on the issue have harmed some of those seeking help.”).  
12 Advocates criticized the White House for leveraging anti-trafficking rhetoric to justify 
immigration enforcement efforts, while “abandon[ing] actual survivors of trafficking 
when they need immigration relief themselves.” See, e.g., Melissa Gira Grant, The Trump 
Administration Finally Broke the Anti-Trafficking Movement, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 18, 
2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/156579/trump-administration-finally-broke-anti-
trafficking-movement [https://perma.cc/92B7-GBNY] (“While the Trump administration 
uses a sensationalistic, false narrative of trafficking at the southern border to justify anti-
immigrant policies—and stoke racist panic among Trump’s base about threats to white 
women—it has abandoned actual survivors of trafficking when they need immigration 
relief themselves.”). As Trump has intensified immigration enforcement efforts, many 
scholars and activists express alarm that immigrant victims of trafficking were caught in 
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pointed to rising denial rates for T visas, a specialized form of 
immigration relief for trafficking victims. They also highlighted new, 
significant barriers that immigrant victims of trafficking faced when 
applying for immigration benefits.13 Martina Vandenberg, founder of the 
Human Trafficking Legal Center, noted, “We have such a chasm between 
rhetoric and reality,” accusing the Administration of “undermining 
protections carefully built for trafficking victims over two decades.”14  
The legislative landscape seemed protective. Over two decades 
ago, Congress recognized the unique challenges faced by immigrant 
victims of trafficking by passing novel federal anti-trafficking legislation. 
In the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) of 2000, Congress 
noted that instead of finding refuge, immigrant victims “are repeatedly 
punished more harshly than the traffickers themselves” because they find 
themselves subject to both criminal penalties and harsh immigration 
enforcement efforts.15 Legislators, thus, embraced the need to “protect[] 
rather than punish[]” trafficking victims16 and established specialized 
protections, including T visas,17 U visas,18 and Continued Presence.19  
 
the crosshairs, targeted with deportation or rendered more vulnerable to trafficking. See 
Susan Tiefenbrun, The Saga of Susannah, A U.S. Remedy for Sex Trafficking in Women: 
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2002, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 107, 
114 (2002) [hereinafter Tiefenbrun, The Saga] (“[I]mmigration laws that are zealously 
enforced in the destination countries in an effort to protect victims often have a negative 
effect on the very victims they seek to protect by requiring their deportation.”); Julie 
Dahlstrom, Trump’s harsh immigration policies are a gift for human traffickers, HILL 
(July 12, 2018), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/396781-trumps-harsh-
immigration-policies-are-a-gift-for-human-traffickers [https://perma.cc/AT7S-V8P9] 
(describing how immigration enforcement efforts under the Trump Administration have 
rendered immigrant victims more vulnerable). 
13 Advocates observed that many immigrant victims, afraid of deportation and/or reprisals 
from traffickers, were unable to step forward to cooperate with law enforcement or to apply 
for important immigration protections. See Abigail Adams, ‘I Thought I Was Going to Die.’ 
How Donald Trump’s Immigration Agenda Set Back the Clock on Fighting Human 
Trafficking, TIME MAG. (Oct. 30, 2020), https://time.com/5905437/human-trafficking-
trump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/DL35-9Y3Q]. 
14 Contrera, supra note 11. 
15 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 
102(b)(17), 114 Stat. 1464 [hereinafter TVPA].  
16 Id. at § 102(b)(24). 
17 T nonimmigrant status has been called colloquially “T visas.” For consistency, this 
article refers to T nonimmigrant status throughout this article as a “T visa,” and U 
nonimmigrant status for victims of violent crime as a “U visa.” For a discussion of the 
requirements to qualify for T visas, see infra Part I.C. This article focuses exclusively on 
T-1 visas, which are available to victims of a “severe form of trafficking,” rather than 
derivative T visas. Therefore, this article uses T visa to refer to T-1 visas, unless 
otherwise noted. 
18 For a discussion of the requirements to qualify for U visas, see infra Part I.C. 
19 For a discussion about Continued Presence, see infra Part I.C. 
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Since 2000, however, annual T visa approvals for immigrant 
victims have remained dismally low.20 Despite a cap of 5,000 available 
annually, T visa approvals for immigrant victims have never reached over 
1,100 annually.21 Moreover, T visa approval rates declined dramatically in 
the last five years.22 For example, approval rates for immigrant victims fell 
from 71.88% in fiscal year 2015 to 57.21% in 2020.23 At the same time, 
processing times for T visas have skyrocketed, as more applicants 
received requests for additional evidence and denials.24  
These trends have had a significant impact on immigrant victims.25 
As Martina Vandenberg, Director of the Human Trafficking Legal Center, 
explained, “Trafficking victims are living in terror.”26 Emelia, an 
immigrant victim of sex trafficking, applied for a T visa after a decade of 
silence and fear.27 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), 
 
20 See USCIS, FORM I-914, APPLICATION FOR T NONIMMIGRANT STATUS BY FISCAL 
YEAR, QUARTER, AND CASE STATUS: FISCAL YEARS 2008–2020, 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/I914t_visastatistics_fy2020_qt
r4.pdf [https://perma.cc/49U3-AKK3] [hereinafter USCIS STATISTICS]; USCIS, Form 1-
914 Application for T Nonimmigrant Status, Service-wide Receipts, Completions, and 
Pending, Service-wide Receipts, Approvals, and Denials Fiscal Years: 2002 Through 
2013, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/data/I914T-
I918_visastatistics_2012-nov.pdf. When referencing approval and denial rates for T 
visas, this article refers to USCIS data in USCIS STATISTICS, specifically the column 
entitled “[v]ictims of [t]rafficking,” which provides the number of applications approved, 
denied, and pending. All approval or denial rates reference applications decided during 
the fiscal year, rather than applications received in a given year. See id. 
21 The only fiscal year that T visa approvals for victims of trafficking (not derivative 
family members) exceeded 1,000 was in 2020. Îd. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. The author has calculated the approval rates in this article as the number of “[v]ictims 
of [t]rafficking” with “approved” applications divided by the sum of the number of 
“victims of trafficking with “approved” and “denied” applications.  
24 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2020 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT: UNITED 
STATES 518 (June 16, 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-
TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TAH-L288] [hereinafter 
2020 TIP REPORT] (“Advocates noted a continuing rise in the number of requests for 
additional evidence by adjudicators, which tends to increase processing times, and 
reported increased T visa denials that they believed improperly interpreted relevant 
statutes and regulations.”). 
25 Abigail Abrams, ‘I Thought I Was Going to Die.’ How Donald Trump’s Immigration 
Agenda Set Back the Clock on Fighting Human Trafficking, TIME MAG. (Oct. 30, 2020), 
https://time.com/5905437/human-trafficking-trump-administration/ 
[https://perma.cc/DL35-9Y3Q] (describing a victim who “because of delays seemingly 
designed to deter new T visa applications and reduce the total number offered each 
year…finds herself in a prolonged legal purgatory”). 
26 Id. (quoting Martina Vandenberg: “The Trump Administration’s immigration policies 
have made foreign trafficking victims’ lives more dangerous. Those policies have made it 
more difficult to escape. And those policies have made it more difficult to obtain relief.”). 
27 This case is based on a client represented by the BU Law Immigrants’ Rights and 
Human Trafficking Program. The name has been changed to protect client 
confidentiality, and the client has consented to the use of her information in this article. 
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the agency that adjudicates T visa cases, issued a denial notice to her, 
stating that it “is sensitive to what you have been through and 
acknowledges the help you have received in relation to your trafficking 
situation.”28 Nonetheless, USCIS denied Emelia’s claim, claiming that her 
current presence in the United States was unrelated to the trafficking.29 
This finding came despite evidence of significant trauma and the need for 
ongoing mental health treatment to heal from the trafficking.30  
Emelia story is not an outlier. During the first three months of 
2020 when Emelia’s case was decided, USCIS denied 50.00% of all T visa 
cases it adjudicated.31 These denials included labor and sex trafficking 
cases. For example, USCIS also denied the T visa application of a 
Peruvian immigrant, known only as Jane Doe in federal pleadings.32 Doe, 
an immigrant victim of labor trafficking, was recruited as a child to work 
in the United States, but upon arrival, her employers took her passport, 
paid her only $100 per month, and made her work long hours with no days 
off.33 Doe’s T visa was denied, and she was placed in removal 
proceedings.34 Desperate to prevent her own deportation, the plaintiff filed 
a federal lawsuit against USCIS, challenging the agency’s actions as 
“arbitrary and capricious.”35 Mercer Cauley, Doe’s attorney, explained, 
“Basically the government has told her, ‘Yes, you are a victim of 
trafficking, but we’re going to deport you anyway.’”36  
This Article examines why legislative efforts aimed at protection 
for immigrant victims of human trafficking are failing. Scholars have 
offered various explanations for low T visa numbers.37 Some have 
 
28 Please see redacted denial notice (on file with author). 
29 Id. 
30 See id. 
31 See USCIS STATISTICS, supra note 21. 
32 Complaint at 6, Doe v. Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020). 
33 Complaint at 11, Doe v. Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020). 
34 Michael Gordon, Lured to U.S. at 16, she sought visa for trafficking victims. Now she 




35 Id at 4. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Sabrina Balgamwalla, Jobs Looking for People, People Looking for Their 
Rights: Seeking Relief for Exploited Immigrant Workers in North Dakota, 91 N.D. L. 
REV. 483, 494–95 (2015) (describing the challenges that victims face demonstrating they 
meet the T visa requirements, including that they are a victim of a “severe form of 
trafficking” and in the United States “on account of” the trafficking, among other 
requirements); Jennifer Chacón, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims 
in the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609 (2010) (exposing the 
tensions and trade-offs between immigration policy choices and anti-trafficking efforts) 
[hereinafter Chacón, Tensions]; Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, The Trafficking and 
Exploitation Victims Assistance Program: A Proposed Early Response Plan for Victims 
of International Human Trafficking in the United States, 38 N.M. L. REV. 373, 376 
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observed how victims, especially those without legal representation, find it 
challenging to navigate the burdensome T visa requirements.38 Others 
have tied low approval rates to a flawed federal framework that prioritizes 
prosecution over victim protection.39 More generally, some have observed 
how the existing statutory framework allows pervasive myths—including 
racialized and gendered narratives about “rescue” and “escape”—to shape 
who is deserving of relief.40  
 
(2008) [hereinafter Cianciarulo, Proposed Early Response Plan] (pointing to structural 
challenges in the protection framework and “unrealistic expectations” by law 
enforcement about what type of protection they can provide to immigrant victims); Dina 
Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural 
Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 346 (2007) (arguing that the pronounced role of law enforcement in the 
T visa process has reduced the effectiveness of immigration protections for victims); 
Srikantiah, supra note 9 (arguing that agency regulations have narrowed T visa 
availability by focusing on prosecutorial goals of the “iconic victim”).  
38 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. NAT’L INST. OF JUST. & OFF. FOR ACCESS TO JUST. WITH THE 
NAT’L SCI. FOUND., WHITE HOUSE LEGAL AID INTERAGENCY ROUND TABLE: CIVIL 
LEGAL AID RESEARCH WORKSHOP 21–22 (2016), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249776.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R3A-PX6T] 
(highlighting the challenges faced by victims when accessing legal aid and 
recommending more research dedicated to pro bono representation and outcomes); U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, OVC FACT 
SHEET: THE LEGAL RIGHTS AND NEEDS OF VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2015), 
https://ovc.ncjrs.gov/humantrafficking/Public_Awareness_Folder/Fact_Sheet/HT_Legal_
Rights_Needs_fact_sheet-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVB5-GMBU] (describing 
significant unmet legal needs for victims of trafficking); WHITE HOUSE, COORDINATION, 
COLLABORATION, CAPACITY: THE FEDERAL STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN ON SERVICES FOR 
VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES, 2013–2017 (2018), 
https://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/media/document/FederalHumanTrafficki
ngStrategicPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/35VZ-2SB7] (“While human trafficking victims 
may be eligible for T or U nonimmigrant status, which allows victims to remain and work 
in the United States and assist law enforcement authorities in the investigation or 
prosecution of human trafficking cases, many victims continue to face legal constraints 
challenging their recovery process.”).  
39 See, e.g., Balgamwalla, supra note 37, at 494 (describing how law enforcement’s 
“gendered portrayals of trafficking” is a barrier for victims of trafficking and failed 
efforts to identify trafficking victims can result in incarceration or deportation); 
Cianciarulo, Proposed Early Response Plan, supra note 37 at 388 (arguing that the 
requirement that victims of trafficking cooperate with law enforcement “expos[es] the 
[human trafficking] victims to the skepticism and enforcement mentality of law 
enforcement officials [that] has proven antithetical to the goals of the T visa”); 
Srikantiah, supra note 9, at 160 (“On a structural level, agency regulations place the 
responsibility of identifying trafficking victims and assessing victims’ cooperation with 
law enforcement in the hands of prosecutors and agents responsible for investigating 
traffickers.”).  
40 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia: Understanding the Failures of U.S. 
Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2977, 3022–23 (2006) 
[hereinafter, Chacón, Misery] (asserting that the TVPA’s “unwillingness to extend 
protections to ‘illegal workers’ absent a showing of their ‘innocence’ embeds into the 
TVPA the same immigration and labor law policies that have created a haven for 
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This Article argues that these critiques, while important and 
correct, do not adequately explain declining T visa approvals. It posits that 
the actions of administrative actors at USCIS in the “shallow state” have 
played a formative role in curtailing protections.41 While much scholarly 
attention has focused on the “deep state” and public acts of bureaucratic 
resistance to uphold the rule of law and basic human rights protections,42 
this Article examines a more subtle phenomena: the workings of the often-
silent “shallow state.”43 Unlike the deep state, administrative actors in the 
shallow state leverage their knowledge and experience of the 
administrative system to engage in innovation that represses rights. This 
tendency can be more extreme when there is lack of executive oversight or 
even the tacit acquiescence or approval of the executive to undermine 
congressional intent and the administration of federal benefits programs.  
This article traces how under the former Trump Administration, 
members of the shallow state enacted diverse, diffuse policies to impede 
immigrant applicants from accessing T visas.44 It shows how, for example, 
USCIS issued a new policy in 2018 to place all denied T visa applicants 
immediately in removal (i.e., deportation) proceedings.45 Contrary to over 
a decade of practice, this policy had an immediate chilling effect, 
increasing applicant fears of deportation, heightening the stakes, and 
discouraging immigrant victims from filing new T visa applications.46 
Meanwhile, quickly and with little notice, the agency tightened fee waiver 
standards, raised fees, and summarily rejected new applications that failed 
to comply with these new fee standards.47 Around the same time, an online 
alert went out to applicants and attorneys announcing that any T visa 
applications would be quickly and quietly rejected if a single field was left 
blank.48  
 
trafficking and migrant exploitation”); Haynes, supra note 37, at 346 (“[G]overnment 
officials appear to subscribe to several myths and imperfect syllogistic reasoning which 
prevent them from seeing a victim when he or she is standing in front of them.”). 
41 See infra Part II. 
42 See infra Part II.B. 
43 This term was first coined by David Rothkopf in The Shallow State. See David 
Rothkopf, The Shallow State, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/22/the-shallow-state-trump/ [https://perma.cc/2T53-
N4CK]. See infra Part II for a greater discussion of the “shallow state.” 
44 Editorial Board, Trump’s immigration policies are straight out of dystopian fiction, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-
immigration-policies-are-straight-out-of-dystopian-fiction/2020/02/20/4c335dfa-5361-
11ea-b119-4faabac6674f_story.html [https://perma.cc/D27F-G5HL] [hereinafter 
Dystopian Fiction] (“Other moves, just as or more effective, are bureaucratic booby traps 
laid in arcane procedural byways.”). 
45 See infra Part II.C.1 for a detailed discussion of this policy. This policy also applied to 
applicants for U visas who were victims of crime. 
46 Id. 
47 See infra Part II.C.2 regarding the fee waiver and “no spaces” policy. 
48 See Catherine Rampell, This latest trick from the Trump administration is one of the most 
despicable yet, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2020, 4:24 PM), 
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USCIS simultaneously began to issue more requests for additional 
evidence and denials to T visa applicants.49 This trend came despite the 
fact that trafficking victims often lacked corroborative evidence and 
existing regulations required only that immigrant victims present “credible 
evidence” to meet certain requirements.50 In the interim, processing times 
for T visas ballooned from 7.9 months in 2016 to 2.4 years in 2020.51 
These delays meant that immigrant victims had to wait, without legal 
status, for more than two years—some only to find their applications 
denied.  
This article shows argues that these disparate policies worked in 
concert to create “minefields”52 in the T visa application process and to 
frustrate the purpose of federal anti-trafficking law.53 It acknowledges that 
these policies impacted other types of immigration applications beyond 
the T visa, but it examines the T visa context to show the devastating 
impact of these policies one particular population—immigrant victims of 
trafficking.  
Part I examines the evolution of U.S. federal law regarding human 
trafficking and immigrant victims. It explores how the Congress first 
conceptualized criminal and immigration enforcement responses. Part I 
shows how, prior to the TVPA, immigrant victims remained unprotected 
and subject to harsh immigration measures. It then describes contemporary 




f5043eb3918a_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q8AJ-L2GH] (“The policy change, at first 
affecting just asylum applicants, was announced without fanfare on the USCIS website 
sometime in the fall.”).  
49 See 2020 TIP REPORT, supra note 24, at 518. 
50 See 8 CFR § 214.11(d)(2)(i) (2020) (“An application for T nonimmigrant status must 
include… [a]ny credible evidence that the applicant would like USCIS to consider 
supporting any of the eligibility requirements set out in paragraphs (f), (g), (h) and (i) of 
this section.”). 
51 Abrams, supra note 25. 
52 Dystopian Fiction, supra note 44 (describing administrative policies to make 
government forms “minefields, intentionally designed to entrap the unsuspecting”); 
Editorial Board, This latest trick from the Trump administration is one of the most 




53 An October 2020 report to members of Congress called attention to the 
“underutilization” of the T visa program. CONGRESSIONAL RSCH. SERV., IMMIGRATION 
RELIEF FOR VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING 12 (Oct. 18, 2020), 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46584 [https://perma.cc/3SPV-ZE6Q] 
[hereinafter IMMIGRATION RELIEF FOR VICTIMS] (documenting the failure of T visa 
approvals to reach the cap of 5,000 and encouraging policymakers to “look at factors that 
potentially contribute to what some observers consider to be underutilization of…[T 
nonimmigrant] status”).  
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crimes and by establishing more robust immigration protections. Part I 
then explores how these specialized immigration benefits for trafficking 
victims have remained insufficient.  
 Part II introduces the concept of the shallow state. It examines how 
administrative actors, particularly at USCIS, have significantly curtailed 
statutory protections for immigrant victims. It catalogues the tactics 
employed by administrative actors in the T visa context and shows how 
low-level bureaucratic officials have transformed outcomes for immigrant 
victims. It also examines how plaintiffs have effectively challenged these 
policies through federal litigation. 
Part III then provides recommendations to guide future efforts to 
improve adjudications of T visa applications and address harms caused by 
the shallow state under the former Trump Administration. This Part argues 
that existing immigration protections can still function well to protect 
victims, if there is sufficient agency and judicial review, oversight, 
training, and accountability.  
I. CONTEMPORARY SOLUTIONS FOR IMMIGRANT VICTIMS 
A. Early Tools to Address Human Trafficking 
 
The Congress has long been concerned with human trafficking 
involving immigrant victims. Early congressional action, however, 
focused on criminal and immigration enforcement, rather than protection 
efforts.54 In the early twentieth century, Congress, motivated in part by 
nativist reaction to rising immigration, sought to levy new criminal 
penalties against perpetrators of sex trafficking.55 Instead of a protection 
framework for immigrant victims, Congress engaged in racialized and 
gendered immigration enforcement efforts.56 These measures often had the 
effect of penalizing and excluding immigrants, and exposed the need for a 
broad protection framework, which Congress would not enact until 
2000.57 
 
54 See generally Ann Wagner & Rachel Wagley McCann, Prostitutes of Prey? The 
Evolution of Congressional Intent in Combating Sex Trafficking, 54 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
17, 28–45 (2017) (describing the historical evolution of laws related to sex trafficking). 
55 See id. 
56 See, e.g., Chacón, Misery, supra note 40, at 2980-81 (2006) (“As before, current anti-
trafficking efforts are characterized by: the presumptive criminality of migrants; a 
willingness to sacrifice the protection of migrants in the furtherance of criminal 
prosecutions; a conflation of trafficking and prostitution; a racially biased conception of 
trafficking; and a dogged focus on interdiction efforts over internal enforcement and 
outreach.”). 
57 See infra Part II.A. 
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In the early twentieth century, Congress took aim at sex trafficking 
in the guise of “white slavery.”58 Activists and politicians often drew 
racialized, sensationalized portraits of the “white slave trade.” 59 As 
Congress, for example, focused on the plight of white, European women, 
kidnapped or forced into the sex trade, non-white immigrant women were 
targeted with harsh immigration measures.60 For example, at the time, 
Congress largely viewed Chinese female immigrants as deviant and thus 
constructed regulatory and enforcement schemes to limit Chinese 
immigration into the United States.61 In fact, the very first federal 
 
58 See, e.g., Tiefenbrun, The Saga, supra note 13, at 131 (describing how the First 
Congress of the International Abolitionist Federation generated awareness of white 
slavery in 1877). 
59 The term “white slave traffic,” is a heavily racialized term, focusing on the trafficking 
of White, predominantly Eastern European women, as distinguished from African 
slavery. See, e.g., Jean Allain, White Slave Traffic in International Law, 1 J. 
TRAFFICKING HUM. EXPLOITATION 1, 6 (Feb. 1, 2017) (examining the international 
origins of the fight against “white slave traffic” at the 1902 International Conference on 
the White Slave Traffic). Historians have pointed to early criminal cases in the twentieth 
century of “white slavery” as powerful proof of the existence of white slavery. See, e.g., 
RUTH ROSEN, THE LOST SISTERHOOD: PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA: 1900–1918 (1982). 
However, some scholars have argued that the concept of “white slavery” was exaggerated 
and mobilized instrumentally by early reformers to address a range of social issues. See, 
e.g., BRIAN DONOVAN, WHITE SLAVE CRUSADES: RACE, GENDER, AND ANTI-VICE 
ACTIVISM, 1887–1917 16 (2006) (examining how “[t]he white slavery genre provided a 
touchstone for a new set of racial and gender projects”); BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, 
UNEASY VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND THE AMERICAN REFORM 
TRADITION 140, 174 (1987) (arguing that “white slavery” was a rhetorical manifestation 
of concerns with a range of social issues, including economic inequality, “local 
government and police corruption from commerce,” “the spread of venereal disease,” and 
emerging views about the evolving sexuality of women). 
60 See, e.g., Mara Keire, The Vice Trust: A Reinterpretation of the White Slavery Scare in 
the United States, 1907-1917, 35 J. OF SOC. HISTORY 5, 17 (2001)  (describing how at the 
height of the white slavery “scare,” reformers “fought for a series of white slave traffic 
acts,” including the Mann Act.); Chacón, Misery, supra note 40, at 3012 (outlining early 
twentieth century efforts by Congress that were “at base, anti-immigrant measures dressed 
in a cloak of morality” and noting that the Page Act, in particular, was “designed as a means 
of excluding Chinese immigration” using an “apparent moral agenda”); Mara Keire, The 
Vice Trust: A Reinterpretation of the White Slavery Scare in the United States, 1907-1917, 
35 J. OF SOC. HISTORY 5, 17 (2001) (“[S]cholars have emphasized the racialized cast of the 
white slavery narratives, even as they have discounted the white slavery scare as an almost 
Freudian manifestation of middle-class fears about urbanization, immigration, and 
women’s increased mobility.”). 
61 Early census efforts showed that a large percentage of Chinese women in the United 
States were involved in commercial sex, but scholars have critiqued such data. Compare 
Abrams, supra note 25, at 653 (“Census reports indicate that by 1870 there were 
upward of two thousand Chinese women living in San Francisco, and that a majority-
somewhere in the neighborhood of seventy percent-were prostitutes.”) with YONG 
CHEN, CHINESE SAN FRANCISCO, 1850–1943: A TRANS-PACIFIC COMMUNITY 75–87 
(2000) (arguing that census takers failed to count individuals not involved in commercial 
sex); BENSON TONG, UNSUBMISSIVE WOMEN: CHINESE PROSTITUTES IN NINETEENTH-
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immigration law, the Page Act, targeted certain Asian immigrants with 
exclusion from the United States for suspected involvement in commercial 
sex.62  
Immigration law in the early twentieth century evolved to embody 
even more restrictive tendencies.63 Indeed, Congress passed immigration 
measures in 1903 and 1907 targeting those involved in commercial sex.64 
These efforts were not uncontroversial.65 At the time, even the 
Commissioner-General of Immigration opined about how, “[g]enerally 
virtuous when she comes to this country,” the immigrant victim is “ruined 
and exploited because there is no adequate protection and assistance.”66 
Instead of calling for protective measures, however, he advocated for more 
“drastic” immigration controls.67 
 
CENTURY SAN FRANCISCO 15, 57 (1994) (providing countervailing estimates of Chinese 
prostitution).  
62 Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration (Page Law), ch. 141, 18 
Stat. 477 (1875) (repealed 1974). See Abrams, supra note 25, at 641; Pooja R. Dadhania, 
Deporting Undesirable Women, 54 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 53, 57 (2018). This article uses 
the term “commercial sex” to refer to “any sex act, on account of which anything of value 
is given to or received by any person,” including both tangible and intangible items. See 
18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(3). 
63 Congress passed “An act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States” 
on March 3, 1903. Immigration Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-162, § 1012, 32 Stat. 1213 
(criminalizing importing individuals involved in commercial sex). On February 20, 1907, 
Congress revised the law in “An act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United 
States,” banning noncitizens from engaging in commercial sex within three years of 
entry. Immigration Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, § 1134, 34 Stat. 898 (criminalizing 
importing individuals for commercial sex). 
64 Id. 
65 Dr. Maude Miner Hadden, for example, pointed out that immigrant women were “more 
easily exploited because of ignorance of American customs, language, and agencies to 
which they might turn for help. . . . They are cowed by threats of deportation [made by 
procurers].” KELLI ANN MCCOY, CLAIMING VICTIMS : THE MANN ACT, GENDER, AND 
CLASS IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1910–1930S 40 (2010), 
https://escholarship.org/content/qt8f60q9gt/qt8f60q9gt.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQE5-
FB7R] (citing MAUDE MINER HADDEN, QUEST FOR PEACE: PERSONAL AND POLITICAL 
(1968)). Jane Addams, another reformer, simply called for “a less punitive policy that 
protected immigrants from exploitation.” Id. (citing JANE ADDAMS, NEW CONSCIENCE AND 
AN ANCIENT EVIL, 26, 35 (1912)). 
66 THE VICE COMM’N OF CHICAGO, THE SOCIAL EVIL IN CHICAGO 40 (4th ed. 1912). See 
also U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM’N, ABSTRACTS OF REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION 
COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 61-747, at 342 (3rd Sess. 1910) (describing how the immigrant 
woman “is ignorant of the language of the country, knows nothing beyond a few blocks 
of the city where she lives, has usually no money, and no knowledge of the rescue homes 
and institutes which might help her”).  
67 Wagner & McCann, supra note 54, at 724. For example, “[t]he Commissioner argued 
that existing immigration laws were ‘not extensive and drastic enough in terms to 
effectively prevent further additions to the already large numbers of alien prostitutes and 
procurers in this country’ and did not sufficiently regulate ‘the free passage to and fro of 
those engaged in [trafficking].’” See also COMM’R GEN. IMMIGR., S. DOC. NO. 61-214, pt. 
2, at 14 (3d Sess. 1910).  
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Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the White Slave Traffic Act of 
1910, commonly known as the Mann Act.68 The Mann Act created new 
federal criminal jurisdiction over commercial sex but failed to establish 
more robust protections for victims.69 This move too faced some 
opposition. Kate Waller Barrett, a Special Agent of the United States 
Immigration Service, was convinced that immigrant victims needed 
protection from deportation.70 She remarked that “[a] woman accused of 
prostitution must not be flung out of the country upon flimsy evidence, 
without due process of law.”71  
Throughout the twenty-first century, Congress remained concerned 
about labor trafficking practices “akin to slavery,” including those 
involving immigrant workers.72 The Thirteenth Amendment had 
prohibited slavery, involuntary servitude, and related practices, and many 
scholars argued that it embodied a broad guarantee of freedom beyond 
African slavery.73 Nevertheless, the Thirteenth Amendment failed to 
embody any affirmative rights or protections for immigrant workers, such 
as freedom from deportation.74  
 
68 White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2421–2424). 
69 Id. Indeed, some immigrants deemed “helpful” in Mann Act cases at prosecution were 
eventually deported. See McCoy, supra note 65, at 151. 
70 See Egal Feldman, Prostitution, the Alien Woman and the Progressive Imagination, 
1910–1915, 19 AM. Q. 199, 200 (1967). 
71 Id. 
72 See, e.g., Maria Ontiveros, Immigrants Rights and the Thirteenth Amendment, 16 NEW 
LABOR FORUM 26, 27 (2007) (“[W]hen declaring slavery and involuntary servitude 
unconstitutional, the Amendment sought to affirmatively protect free labor by establishing 
a definition of free labor more expansive than the absence of chattel slavery.”). 
73 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see also Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995) (“From the opening gavel, both 
sides in the legislative debates based their arguments on a common understanding that the 
Thirteenth Amendment would protect an expansive definition of freedom.”). Lea 
VanderVelde through historiography has examined how the Amendment provided 
“charter for labor freedom,” which sought to affirmatively protect the rights of labor 
“autonomy and independence.” Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 438 (1989) [hereinafter VanderVelde, Labor 
Vision] (arguing that the Congressional debate embodied a “free labor” vision, and thus, 
the Amendment sought to improve the “cause of all working people,” not only those 
subject to African slavery). Some scholars, however, have critiqued VanderVelde’s 
expansive vision, calling this historiography “deeply flawed” and “significantly 
overstating” of the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Pamela Brandwein, The 
“Labor Vision” of the Thirteenth Amendment, Revisited, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13, 
17 (2017) (“Multiple arrays of evidence support the conclusion that VanderVelde 
mistakes free labor for a discourse of class leveling and thus mistakes the Thirteenth 
Amendment as a charter for labor freedom.”).  
74 See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the 
Constitutional Law of “Involuntary Servitude,” 119 YALE L. J. 1474, 1478 (2010) (“[I]t 
prohibits two conditions—slavery and involuntary servitude—without specifying what 
rights are necessary to negate those conditions.”). The Thirteenth Amendment, instead, 
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In 1940, Congress passed enabling statutes pursuant to the 
Thirteenth Amendment to criminalize peonage, enticement into slavery, 
and sale into involuntary servitude.75 These statutes would remain the 
primary criminal enforcement tools aimed at labor trafficking for decades. 
However, immigrant victims, even those who cooperated fully in federal 
prosecutions, often faced detention, deportation, and an uncertain future in 
the United States.76 
B. Contemporary Efforts to Address Trafficking 
 
In the 1990s, several high profile cases showcased the brutality of 
human trafficking and the imperfect tools available to shield immigrant 
victims from deportation.77 In 1995, for example, government officials 
raided a complex where they found seventy-two Thai nationals working in 
slave-like conditions in residential duplexes in El Monte, California.78 
Recruiters forced victims to work while holding their passports and 
money.79 The case was followed by a highly publicized labor trafficking 
case in 1997 in Jackson Heights, New York, involving fifty-seven deaf 
immigrants.80 Renato Paoletti Lemus, the alleged boss of the operation, 
and his family members recruited Mexican immigrants through “promises 
of a sweeter life” in the United States.81 Once the victims arrived, Lemus 
and his associates took their documents, forced them to work,  and 
subjected them to emotional, physical, and sexual abuse.82  
 
relied on Congress to “enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIII. 
75 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583–84 (2018). 
76See, e.g., KEVIN BALES & STEVEN LIZE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 70 (Nat’l Inst. Just., 2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211980.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6WX2-MMER] [hereinafter TRAFFICKING IN THE U.S.] (describing the 
use of detention and fear of removal to inspire immigrant victims to cooperate). 
77 See ALICIA PETERS, RESPONDING TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING: SEX, GENDER, AND 
CULTURE IN THE LAW 57–58 (2015). 
78 Id. at 57. 
79 Erin Blakemore, 20th-Century Slavery was Hiding in Plain Sight, SMITHSONIAN MAG., 
July 31, 2020, 10:00 AM, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-
institution/20th-century-slavery-california-sweatshop-was-hiding-plain-sight-180975441/ 
[https://perma.cc/8E3M-Y5WB].  
80 PETERS, supra note 77, at 1–2; Deborah Sontag, Dozens of Deaf Immigrants 




mattresses%20and%20sleeping [https://perma.cc/U9AX-6JWN].  
81 KEVIN BALES, THE SLAVE NEXT DOOR: HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SLAVERY IN 
AMERICA TODAY 124 (2009). 
82 See, e.g., Joseph Fried, 2 Sentenced in Mexican Peddling Ring, N.Y. TIMES at B3 (May 
8, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/08/nyregion/2-sentenced-in-mexican-
peddling-ring.html [https://perma.cc/RVY9-HKBG]; BALES, supra note 81, at 113. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3860845




Sex trafficking, too, was in the headlines.83 In 1998, the New York 
Times publicized a fifty-two-count indictment against sixteen people, six 
of whom were from the same Cadena family, for “enslav[ing]” at least 
twenty women, some as young as fourteen, for over a year.84 Immigrant 
women were recruited from Mexico to work in “landscaping, health care, 
housecleaning and restaurants.”85 Yet, upon arrival in the United States, 
the Cadenas forced their victims to have sex with men in agricultural 
migrant camps to repay their smuggling debt.86 Those who tried to escape 
were beaten and sexually abused.87  
These cases publicly highlighted the deficiencies of existing 
protection measures for immigrant victims.88 In the El Monte trafficking 
cases, immigration officials initially detained and held victims in 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) custody.89 Although 
eventually released after public protests, immigrant victims faced a long, 
uncertain battle against deportation.90 One victim speaking at a criminal 
trafficking sentencing hearing, noted: “We were slaves . . . and we have 
nothing to show for it. I am very angry.”91  
These practices were, unfortunately, widespread.92 A report, 
entitled “International Trafficking in Women to the United States,” drew 
national attention to continued protection challenges for immigrant 
victims.93 The report unearthed how victims were often detained and 
 
83 Mireya Navarro, Group Forced Illegal Aliens into Prostitution, U.S. says, N. Y. TIMES, 






88 AMY O’NEILL RICHARD, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF INTEL., INTERNATIONAL 
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES: A CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATION OF 
SLAVERY AND ORGANIZED CRIME 41–44 (1999), 
https://www.cia.gov/static/9dc85527075bc84f9e1f2eef0e7a0915/trafficking.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U49S-MTJ7]; see also PETERS, supra note 77, at 2 (describing how in 
the Paoletti case, for example, “[p]ublic sympathy for the victim and the fact that many 
New Yorkers had encountered these very individuals in their daily commutes promoted 
the city to offer an enormous amount of public resources to the victims).  
89 Blakemore, supra note 79. In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress 
discontinued the INS and created three agencies under a newly created  Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”), including USCIS, Customs and Border Protection, and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. See OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY, USCIS 
HISTORY OFFICE AND LIBRARY (2012), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/fact-sheets/INSHistory.pdf.  
90 Erik Loomis, Historian Erik Loomis on the El Monte Sweatshop Raid, UNITE ALL 
WORKERS FOR DEMOCRACY, https://uawd.org/historian-erik-loomis-on-the-el-monte-
sweatshop-raid/ [https://perma.cc/5JM2-2FRD]. 
91 BALES, supra note 81, at 124.  
92 See RICHARD, supra note 88, at 35. 
93 Id. 
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placed in jails if they failed to voluntarily depart.94 It also shed light on 
troubling practices of INS officials who—apparently uncomfortable with 
“playing favorites”—often conflated victims with “other undocumented 
immigrants,” subjecting both groups to harsh immigration consequences.95  
Law enforcement continued to rely heavily on an imperfect array 
of existing immigration benefits, including deferred action,96 parole,97 and 
S visas,98 to protect against deportation. These ill-fitting remedies were 
often insufficient and difficult to navigate, leaving immigrant victims at 
the mercy of unsympathetic governmental officials.99 As a result, victims 
were left in limbo, and some even faced deportation.100  
For these reasons, many scholars and advocates called for the 
creation of a new, specialized form of immigration relief for trafficking 
victims, known as the T visa. This benefit, they argued, would allow law 
enforcement to have the assistance of “material witnesses” while also 
granting victims a “resting period” during which they could receive 
assistance without fear of deportation.101 Well-known immigration 
advocates, such as Arthur Helton and Eliana Jacobs, proclaimed the great 
potential of the T visa.102 Rather than envisioning the T visa as 
“humanitarian relief for those who have been abused,” Helton and Jacobs 
 
94 Id. at 39 (“Currently, they say that many trafficking victims are placed in INS detention 
facilities and then deported. Those few trafficking victims, who are designated material 
witnesses in federal criminal cases brought against the traffickers, may be placed in the 
US marshals’ custody and held in local jails.”).  
95 Id. at 36. 
96 Deferred action provides access to a work permit and the deferral of removal, but it is 
not an immigration status. Frequently Asked Questions, USCIS (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/frequently-asked-questions 
[https://perma.cc/LZX7-EZ6J] (“Deferred action is a discretionary determination to defer 
a removal action of an individual as an act of prosecutorial discretion.”). 
97 Parole allowed victims to be admitted or enter for “urgent humanitarian reasons” and 
obtain work authorization, but it does not open up a pathway to permanent residency or 
citizenship. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 116-252, § 212(d)(5)(A) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182). 
98 The S visa, colloquially referred to as the “snitch” visa, was established by Congress in 
1994 pursuant to the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. INA § 
101(a)(15)(S), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(S) (1994). Congress provided 200 S visas per year 
to two categories of noncitizens: (1) those who provided critical information about a 
criminal enterprise or organization; and (2) those who possess information about terrorist 
activity. See RICHARD, supra note 88, at 41; see also Douglas Kash, Rewarding 
Confidential Informants: Cashing in on Terrorism and Narcotics Trafficking, 34 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 231, 235 (2002).  
99 See RICHARD, supra note 88, at 39. 
100 See id. at 40–41 (“Due to the existing framework, trafficking victims often faced 
deportation, even before their cases were heard. Additionally, if victims were unable to 
receive a S visa, they faced deportation, and all victims experienced long waits 
throughout the entire process.”).  
101 See RICHARD, supra note 88, at 42. 
102 See Arthur C. Helton & Eliana Jacobs, Combating Human Smuggling by Enlisting the 
Victims, 23 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 127 (2000). 
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noted that “[a] more powerful rationale would be to view the grant of 
immigration status as an incentive to enlist the victims in identifying and 
prosecuting traffickers.”103 The T visa, they argued, would be “a powerful 
new tool . . . made available to law enforcers in their efforts to curb 
clandestine trafficking networks.”104 
C. Federal Legislation to Protect Immigrant Victims 
 
 In 2000, Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
(“TVPA”), the first comprehensive federal human trafficking law.105 
Congress remained largely—although not exclusively—focused on 
“international human trafficking,” involving immigrant victims.106 The 
legislation took note that “[a]t least 700,000 persons annually, primarily 
women and children, are trafficked within or across international 
borders.”107 Similarly, Congress recognized trafficking as a “transnational 
crime with national implications” and acknowledged that “[t]o deter 
international trafficking and bring its perpetrators to justice, nations 
including the United States must recognize that trafficking is a serious 
offense.”108 The TVPA came just days after the United Nations General 
Assembly approved the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (“Trafficking 
Protocol”).109  
In the TVPA, Congress utilized a three-pronged approach, aimed 
at protection, prevention, and prosecution of trafficking both abroad and 
domestically.110 Congress articulated new federal trafficking crimes and 
increased criminal penalties for a wide range of trafficking-related 




105 See TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464. 
106 See TVPA § 102(a); ANTHONY M. DESTEFANO, THE WAR ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING: 
U.S. POLICY ASSESSED 32–41 (2007) (examining how Congress was primarily concerned 
with immigrants trafficked into the United States in 2000 when passing federal anti-
trafficking law). 
107 TVPA § 102(b)(1).  
108 H.R. REP. NO. 939, pt. 24 (2000). 
109 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol]. 
110 See, e.g., Kelly E. Hyland, Protecting Human Victims of Trafficking: An American 
Framework, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 29, 62 (2001) (examining the TVPA’s three-
tier approach addressing prevention, protection, and prosecution); Susan Tiefenbrun, The 
Cultural, Political, and Legal Climate Behind the Fight to Stop Trafficking in Women: 
William J. Clinton’s Legacy to Women’s Rights, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 855, 876–
77 (2006). 
111 Whereas sex trafficking cases had been previously charged often under the Mann Act 
or involuntary servitude statutes, the TVPA established the new federal sex trafficking 
crime to address commercial sex induced through force, fraud or coercion, unless 
involving a minor under eighteen years of age. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2018). In addition, 
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victims. In particular, the TVPA established T visas for victims of 
trafficking, U visas for victims of violent crime, and “Continued 
Presence”112 for victims of trafficking who were witnesses in a potential 
criminal trafficking investigation.113 The legislation was bipartisan, and 
the immigration remedies thus embodied a dual purpose: to protect 
immigrant victims and to encourage victim cooperation with law 
enforcement.114  
T Visas. Congress established T visas for victims of a “severe form 
of trafficking in persons.”115 The statute defined a “severe form of 
trafficking in persons” as distinct from federal trafficking crimes, to 
include both sex and labor trafficking.116 A “severe form of trafficking in 
persons” meant: 
● the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, obtaining, 
patronizing, or soliciting of a person for the purpose of a 
commercial sex act, in which the commercial sex act is induced by 
force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform 
such act has not attained fifteen years of age;117 (or) 
● the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of 
a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, 
peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.118 
The definition, thus, was expansive, to include brazen acts of physical 
violence as well as more subtle forms of coercion, like deportation 
 
responding to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Kozminski, Congress 
created the new crime of forced labor to address “labor or services” involving tactics of 
psychological coercion. See id. § 1589. 
112 Continued Presence is a form of deferred action that provides victims of a “severe form 
of trafficking in persons” who assist in a potential trafficking investigation. See 22 U.S.C. 
§ 7105(c)(3)(A). It provides access to employment authorization and decreased 
prioritization for removal. CENTER FOR COUNTERING HUMAN TRAFFICKING, CONTINUED 
PRESENCE, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/human-trafficking/pdf/continued-presence.pdf 
(last visited: 06/04/2021). 
113 See TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§ 107(c)–(e), 1513(c) 114 Stat. 1464, 1474, 1533 
(2000) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).  
114 Id. § 108(b)(2), 22 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2) (“Whether the government of the country 
protects victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons and encourages their assistance 
in the investigation and prosecution of such trafficking, including provisions for legal 
alternatives to their removal to countries in which they would face retribution or 
hardship, and ensures that victims are not inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or 
otherwise penalized solely for unlawful acts as a direct result of being trafficked”). 
115 See INA § 101(a)(15)(T). 
116 Id. 
117 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 7102(11)–(12). 
118 See 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8). 
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threats.119 It encompassed a wide range of exploitative practices across 
industries, including restaurants, agriculture, and domestic work.120 
To qualify for a T visa, immigrant victims of a “severe form of 
trafficking” also had to meet a variety of other requirements.121 They must 
also: (1) be physically present in the United States or territories “on 
account of” the trafficking; (2) have complied with any reasonable request 
for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking 
(unless under 15 years of age); (3) suffer extreme hardship involving 
unusual and severe harm upon removal; and (4) be admissible.122 These 
requirements considerably narrowed the scope of who qualified. For 
example, in order to comply with a reasonable request from law 
enforcement, adult victims must report to law enforcement and request a 
special victim certification on Form I-914, Supplement B (“I-914B”).123 
Yet, understandably, many victims, due to trauma, stigma, or fear of 
reprisals from the perpetrator, failed to report to law enforcement.124 Also, 
law enforcement often lacked the training necessary to identify trafficking 
and refused to issue a signed I-914B.125 Thus, victims often still faced an 
uphill battle to qualify for relief. 
Despite these challenges, the benefits of the T visa were immense. 
Five-thousand T visas were available annually to victims and, when the 
 
119 See Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 438 
(2011) (“The TVPA supports a broad vision of coercion. It recognizes that in addition to 
physical force, psychological abuse and nonviolent coercion create an environment of fear 
and intimidation that may prevent a worker from leaving an exploitive work situation.”). 
120 See, e.g., TVPA at preamble (“Traffickers lure women and girls into their networks 
through false promises of decent working conditions at relatively good pay as nannies, 
maids, dancers, factory workers, restaurant workers, sales clerks, or models.”). 
121 See INA § 101(a)(15)(T). 
122 TVPA §§ 107(e)(1), 107(e)(3). 
123 INA § 107(e)(1)(C)(i)(III), 114 Stat. 1464 at 1478; 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(a). While the I-
914B was not required, it served as primary evidence of the victim’s cooperation for 
many years.  See 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(d)(3). The 2016 T visa regulations eliminated the 
distinction between secondary and primary evidence and provided that all evidence, 
including the victim’s personal statement, should carry the same weight. Classification 
for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility for “T” Nonimmigrant 
Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 92299 (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2016-12-19/pdf/2016-29900.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV7X-HWVB]. In later 
reauthorizations, Congress clarified that applicants who were victims when they were 
under 18 and those who met a limited trauma exception need not respond to a reasonable 
request for assistance with law enforcement to qualify. See supra note 122. 
124 See, e.g., Carole Angel, Immigration Relief for Human Trafficking Victims: Focusing 
the Lens on the Human Rights of Victims, 7 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class 
23, 25 n.9 (2007) (noting how the law enforcement requirement is “a giant task when one 
knows that law enforcement can deport”). 
125 See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 37, at 21 (describing how lack of training for those in the 
field contributes to reduced identification of victims). 
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program began, processing times were only six months.126 T visa 
applicants were eligible work authorization.127 They could petition for 
certain family members and had an eventual pathway to citizenship.128 T 
visa recipients also could receive the same public benefits as refugees, 
including specialized case management and vocational assistance.129 
These federal benefits served as an essential lifeline for many victims, 
who otherwise lacked access to basic necessities necessary for survival.  
U Visas. In the TVPA, Congress also established U visas for 
victims of certain violent crimes, including human trafficking.130 Like the 
T visas, immigrant victims not only had to be victims of certain qualifying 
crimes but also had to meet other requirements to qualify.131 In particular, 
applicants must show that: (1) they were victims of a qualifying crime 
under state or federal law; (2) the crime violated U.S. law or occurred in 
the United States; (3) the victims suffered a substantial injury related to 
the crime; (4) they had information about the crime; (5) they were helpful 
in the investigation or prosecution of the crime;132 and (6) they were 
admissible in the United States.133 Qualifying crimes included a range of 
violent crimes, including (but not limited to) trafficking, sexual 
exploitation, involuntary servitude, the slave trade, and prostitution.134  
10,000 U visas were available annually, but the cap was regularly 
reached.135 As a result, U visa applicants often waited seven to ten years 
for a visa to become available, as opposed to one or two years in the T 
visa context.136 U visa recipients, like T visa recipients, qualified for work 
 
126 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 13 (Quoting Jean Bruggeman, Executive Director of 
Freedom Network USA, as saying: “Before we had six to 12 months to wait, but it was a 
waiting period that was tinged with hope”).  
127 INA § 214.11(c)(1), (d)(11); 8 C.F.R. § 245.23(a). 
128 TVPA § 105(e)(1); 107(e). Victims are eligible to petition to reunify in the United 
States with certain family members, including spouses and children under 21 for adult 
victims and even certain siblings and parents for children applicants. See INA § 
101(a)(15)(T)(ii). 
129 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1)(E)(i)(II)(aa) (“Federal agencies shall expand benefits and 
services to victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons in the United States, and aliens 
classified as a nonimmigrant under section 1101(a)(15)(T)(ii) of title 8, without regard to 
the immigration status of such victims.”). 
130 See id. § 101(a)(15)(U)(iii).  
131 See id. § 101(a)(15)(U)(i). 
132 As in the T visa context, Congress required applicants to report the crime and assist in 
the investigation and/or prosecution of the crime. Id. § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III). However, 
unlike the T visa context, the applicant must receive U nonimmigrant status certification, 
without which they simply could not qualify. See 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(2)(i).  
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. § 214.14(d); Natalie Nanasi, The U Visa’s Failed Promise for Survivors of 
Domestic Violence, 29 YALE J. OF LAW AND FEM. 273, 277 (2018). 
136 See HUM. RTS. INITIATIVE N. TEX. & SMU JUDGE ELMO B. HUNTER LEGAL CTR., 
Flawed Design: How the U Visa is Revictimizing the People It Was Created to Help 
(Dec. 1, 2020), 
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authorization and had an eventual pathway to citizenship.137 However, 
unlike the T visa, the U visa recipients were not eligible to expansive 
federal public benefits.138 Thus, the T visa remained often the best option 
for trafficking survivors who could meet the federal definition of 
trafficking. 
Continued Presence. Congress also established a new, temporary 
pathway to work authorization for immigrant victims whom law 
enforcement identified as potential witnesses in a criminal trafficking 
investigation.139 Continued Presence was a stopgap measure to allow 
immigrant victims to have quick access to protection while they decided 
whether to pursue a T visa and/or waited for their application to be 
processed.140 Unlike the T visa, victims could not apply on their own for 
Continued Presence.141 Rather, federal law enforcement had to effectively 
sponsor the application.142 Once eligible, victims could receive deferred 
action,143 a work permit, and access to federal public benefits for two 
years.144 Thus, it often provided an important measure to prevent T visa 
applicants from being in limbo, unable to work and subject to deportation, 
while their T visa applications were pending. 
D. A Flawed Federal Framework 
 
The TVPA represented a significant step forward for immigrant 
victims, but in the first ten years of the program, significant barriers 
remained.145 Fewer than 300 T visas were issued in the initial years of the 
 
https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/629a772b95e14b3aa05941ae309909f0 
[https://perma.cc/T3YP-4ZJ7] (“Because of the cap, people filing a U visa petition today 
can expect to wait 7 to 10 years for approval.”); Check Case Processing Times, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/ 
[https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/] (last visited Aug. 28, 2020). 
137 Id. § 214.14(c)(7). 
138 See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(b). 
139 See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3)(A). Continued Presence was available to any individual 
who was “a victim of a severe form of trafficking and a potential witness to such 
trafficking.” Id. 
140 Bo Cooper, A New Approach To Protection and Law Enforcement Under the Victims 
of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 51 EMORY L. J. 1041, 1052 (2002). 
141 See 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3)(A)(i).  
142 Id. 
143 USCIS defines deferred action as “a discretionary determination to defer a deportation 
of an individual as an act of prosecutorial discretion.” USCIS, Frequently Asked Questions 
(2021), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferred-action-for-
childhood-arrivals-daca/frequently-asked-questions (last visited: 05/11/2021). 
144 CONTINUED PRESENCE, USCIS, 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/blue-campaign/19_1028_bc-
pamphlet-continued-presence.pdf [PERMA] (last accessed: Mar. 13, 2021). 
145 See INA §§ 101(a)(15)(T) & (U)(iii).  
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program.146 Similarly, Continued Presence approvals remained low.147 
And while U visa grants skyrocketed, relatively few were issued to 
immigrant victims of trafficking.148 Congress responded by easing 
obstacles within the T visa program for immigrant victims.149 In 
legislative reauthorizations in 2003 and 2008, Congress made a further 
exception for children from fifteen to eighteen years of age from the 
requirement to respond to a reasonable request from law enforcement.150 
Congress also added a new trauma exception to this requirement, available 
to any victim who “is unable to cooperate with such a request due to 
physical or psychological trauma.”151 Moreover, Congress extended 
Continued Presence to two years and allowed noncitizens to qualify if they 
filed a federal civil lawsuit against their perpetrator.152 Further, USCIS 
issued regulations to further ease T visa requirements and encourage more 
victims to apply.153 
 
146 See CHRISTAL MOREHOUSE, COMBATING HUMAN TRAFFICKING POLICY GAPS AND 
HIDDEN POLITICAL AGENDAS IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY 117 (2009) (stating 
that in 2002, the first year where data was available, and 172 victims were granted T 
visas, 453 applications were submitted, and thirteen were denied). U visa approvals, or U 
interim relief as it was called until regulations were issued in 2009, were higher, but it is 
unknown how many, if any, were provided to trafficking victims. See also chart with 
compiled statistics from Trafficking in Persons Reports issued annually by the U.S. 
Department of State (on file with author). While U visa grant rates grew substantially, the 
U.S. government failed to track which, if any, were related to trafficking crimes. See 
2020 TIP report, supra note 24, at 519. 
147 Id. at 117. 
148 Id. 
149 See TVPA, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified in scattered sections of 
U.S.C. as amended at 8 U.S.C.§ 8, 22); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 4(a)(3)(A), 117 Stat. 2875, 2878 (2003) [hereinafter 
TVPRA of 2003]; William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008) [hereinafter “TVPRA of 2008”]. 
150 Id. 
151 INA § 101(a)(15)(T)(iii); 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(h)(1)(3)(ii) (“An alien who, due to 
physical or psychological trauma, is unable to cooperate with a reasonable request for 
assistance in the Federal, State, or local investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking 
in persons, or the investigation of a crime where acts of trafficking in persons are at least 
one central reason for the commission of that crime, is not required to comply with such 
reasonable request.”).  
152 22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3) (2000) (stating that Continued Presence is available to “a 
potential witness to such trafficking” and that “the Secretary of Homeland Security may 
permit the alien to remain in the United States to facilitate the investigation and 
prosecution of those responsible for such crime”), 28 C.F.R. § 1100.35.  
153 See Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility 
for “T” Nonimmigrant Status, 81 Fed. Reg. 92266 (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-12-19/pdf/2016-29900.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GV7X-HWVB]. 
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Despite these important efforts, T visa approvals154 for victims 
only inched upward slightly. 155 The maximum T visas issues in one year 
were 1,040.156 However, even as T visa application rates have increased 
slowly over the past decade, approval rates have steadily declined in 
recent years.157 The T visa approval rate for cases adjudicated in fiscal 
year 2016, for example, was 81.04 %, but this dropped to 57.8% in 2019, 
and 57.21% in 2020.158 The chart159 below illustrates the rising denial 




Perhaps surprisingly, however, applications for T visas have 
steadily increased since 2000.160 In fiscal year 2015, applications for T 
visas reached over 1,000 for the first time since the program began, and 
these numbers have continued to increase steadily in the past few years.161 
For example, whereas USCIS only received 541 T visa applications in 
fiscal year 2010, this number rose to 1,242 and 1,110, in 2019 and 2020, 
 
154 T-1 visas are awarded to victims of a “severe form of trafficking,” as opposed to T-2, 
T-3, T-4, T-5, and T-6 visas for derivative family members. This article primarily focuses 
on approval rates for T-1 visas for victims of trafficking. Thus, throughout, the article uses 
the term “T visa” as a shorthand for T-1 visa. 




159 This figure is based on data available from USCIS. See USCIS STATISTICS, supra note 
21. The percentage represents the number of T visa cases for victims of trafficking 
adjudicated each fiscal year. The rate is calculated by dividing the number of cases for 
victims of trafficking denied during a fiscal year by the sum of the number of cases 
approved and denied each fiscal year. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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respectively.162 The chart163 below is illustrative of the number of 
applications received, approved, and denied since 2008: 
 
 
Declining T visa approval rates have surprisingly coincided with 
increased identification of and greater access to pro bono legal 
representation for victims. In the past four years, federally-funded 
providers have provided services to more immigrant victims of 
trafficking.164 The number of immigrant victims and derivative family 
members identified by certain government-funded programs steadily 
increased from 915 in 2013, to 1,612 in 2018, and 1,573 in 2019.165 At the 
same time, the number of new immigrant victims of trafficking served by 
programs funded by the U.S. Department of Justice rose from 1,009 in 
2013 to 5,090 in 2019.166 Simultaneously, the number of immigrant 
children of trafficking identified by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services increased from 50 in 2009 to and 892 in 2019.167  
The federal government also poured new, unprecedented funding 
into pro bono legal representation for victims of trafficking.168 In fiscal 
year 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice provided new and sweeping 
 
162 Id. 
163 This figure was created by the author based on data available from USCIS. See USCIS 
STATISTICS, supra note 21. 
164 This data was compiled by the author based on data available from annual Trafficking 
in Persons Reports issued by the U.S. Department of State (on file with author).  
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issues Interim Assistance and 
Eligibility Letters to minor victims of a severe form of trafficking. See Eligibility Letters, 
Office on Trafficking in Persons, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/otip/victim-
assistance/eligibility-letters (last accessed 05/10/2021). Such victims are then eligible to 
receive the same public benefits and services as those with refugee status. Id. 
168 See Awards Listing, OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (2020), 
https://ovc.ojp.gov/funding/awards/list [https://perma.cc/5R9M-QRJM]. This included 
the initiation of new grants to provide specialized services and resulted in $9.11 million 
over the following four years. Id. 
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funding of over 8.8 million dollars to establish the Crime Victim Justice 
Corps,169 funding 62 new attorney fellows to represent victims.170 The 
federal government also gave significant funding to the Coalition Against 
Slavery and Trafficking (“CAST”), a national anti-trafficking NGO, to 
formalize training and a technical assistance program to improve 
outcomes in T visa cases.171 As a result, in 2018, CAST trained 337 
attorneys in 30 states, and responded to 900 individual requests for 
technical assistance, a 15% increase from 2017.172 Yet, despite greater 
potential access to free representation, T visa approvals continued to 
decline. 
E. Rationales for Insufficient Protection 
 
Scholars have identified diverse rationales for the low T visa 
numbers.173 Dina Haynes has described how Congress, by requiring adult 
 
169 CRIME VICTIM JUSTICE JUST. CORPS: LEGAL FELLOWS PROGRAM PURPOSE, OFFICE 
OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
https://external.ojp.usdoj.gov/SelectorServer/awards/pdf/award/2017-MU-MU-
K131/2017-40441-DC-VF/2017 [https://perma.cc/2HR2-ARA4].  
170 See Allie Yang-Green, Supporting Human Trafficking Survivors Through Civil Legal 
Aid, EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS (Jan. 11, 2021). 
171 Id.  
172 COAL. TO ABOLISH SLAVERY & TRAFFICKING, 2018 IMPACT REP. at 21, 
http://www.castla.org/wp-content/themes/castla/assets/files/Cast-Impact-Report-2018.pdf 
[PERMA]. 
173 See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 37 (asserting that the emphasis on prosecution and 
criminal investigations combined with the lack of training by law enforcement limited the 
ability of actors to protect immigrant victims); Srikantiah, supra note 9 (arguing that 
administrative officials and law enforcement impermissibly limited the availability of the 
T visa by focusing on the “iconic” victim, placing too much emphasis on law 
enforcement cooperation); Ivy C. Lee. & Mie Lewis, Human Trafficking from A Legal 
Advocate’s Perspective: History, Legal Framework and Current Anti-Trafficking Efforts, 
10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 169, 171 (2003) (describing how the twofold 
congressional focus on prosecution and protection “impacts the kinds of relief that 
trafficked persons may receive”); Ivy Lee, An Appeal of a T Visa Denial, 14 GEO. J. ON 
POV. L. & POL’Y 455 (2007) (analyzing a T visa denial); Cianciarulo, Proposed Early 
Response Plan, supra note 37 (describing how law enforcement’s unrealistic expectations 
of immigrant victims ability and desire to cooperate imperils victim protections); Marisa 
Silenzi Cianciarulo, Modern-Day Slavery and Cultural Bias: Proposals for Reforming 
the U.S. Visa System for Victims of International Human Trafficking, 7 NEV. L.J. 826, 
835–40 (2007) (providing recommendations to overcome persistent challenges in the T 
visa framework); Sally Terry Green, Protection for Victims of Child Sex Trafficking in 
the United States: Forging the Gap Between U.S. Immigration Laws and Human 
Trafficking Laws, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 309 (2008) (documenting how child 
victims of sex trafficking face immense challenges obtaining T visas, despite relaxed 
requirements for victims under 18). Not all scholars, however, were overtly critical of the 
TVPA’s approach to anti-trafficking protections. See, e.g., Susan W. Tiefenbrun, 
Updating the Domestic and International Impact of the U.S. Victims of Trafficking 
Protection Act of 2000: Does Law Deter Crime?, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 249, 278–
79 (2006–2007) (noting the “positive impact of the TVPA on the enactment of anti-
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victims to cooperate with law enforcement, undermined the efficacy of the 
T visa.174 Law enforcement agents remain, in many ways, the gatekeepers 
for immigration protection, and the prominent role of policing has  
prevented many victims from accessing protection.175 Law enforcement 
often was insufficiently trained and unattuned to more subtle forms of 
trafficking.176 Most immigrant victims also have not been found “chained 
to a bed in a brothel,” and thus often unidentified and unable to access 
protection.177  
Building on Haynes’ insights, Jayashri Srikantiah has also 
examined how Congress, in establishing the T visa, envisioned a 
simplistic, passive “iconic” victim.178 Congress “contemplate[d] a victim 
of sex trafficking who passively waits for rescue by law enforcement, and 
upon rescue, presents herself as a good witness who cooperates with all 
law enforcement requests.”179 This embrace of simplistic victim 
narratives, embedded in the statutory and regulatory framework, has thus 
led to insufficient identification by law enforcement and adjudicators.180 
Scholars too have drawn attention to the incompatibility of 
immigration enforcement and anti-trafficking agendas.181 Jennifer Chacón 
has observed that the “line between voluntary migrants who participate in 
 
trafficking legislation in foreign countries” and comparing domestic practices with other 
countries, like Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, which had fewer available protections 
for immigrant victims). 
174 Haynes, supra note 37, at 346 (“There are consequences to having such an emphasis 
on prosecution that not only works to the detriment of victims but also undermines the 
intent of the TVPA.”). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 349 (describing how viewing trafficking through the lens of law enforcement 
can “exacerbate the tendency of U.S. government personnel to treat trafficked persons as 
criminals, particularly when the victim does not fit into the expected mold of being 
rescued after being found chained to a bed in a brothel”). Haynes also described 
challenges that law enforcement faced in identifying victims when they often 
“subscribe[d] overtly or covertly to unhelpful myths about the nature of victims and 
criminals.” Id. at 349. 
178 Srikantiah, supra note 9, at 177 (describing how the regulations and agency 
implementation of the TVPA envision a prototypical victim with several characteristics: 
(1) the victim is a woman or girl trafficked for sex; (2) law enforcement assesses her to be 
a good witness; (3) she cooperates fully with law enforcement investigations; and (4) she 
is rescued instead of escaping from the trafficking enterprise). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. Other scholars, including Sally Green and Bridgette Carr, have further explored 
these deficiencies, highlighting how the T visa failed to work even for the most 
vulnerable. See Green, supra note 173; Bridgette Carr, Examining the Reality of Foreign 
National Child Victims of Human Trafficking in the United States, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 183 (2011) (examining the challenges for child victims to obtain T visas). They 
have pointed to the fact that even trafficked children, a quite vulnerable and compelling 
population, often cannot effectively access the T visa. Id. at 313. 
181 Chacón, Tensions, supra note 37 (exposing the trade-offs between immigration 
enforcement and anti-trafficking efforts). 
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smuggling schemes and unwilling trafficking victims” is “murky at best” 
and “has been vigilantly policed.”182 Thus, often the very efforts to root 
out trafficking reinforce concepts of migrant criminality and thus increase 
the vulnerability of immigrant victims.183 This critique has been borne out 
under the former Trump Administration as advocates argued that 
heightened immigration enforcement efforts increased the vulnerability of 
immigrant victims to trafficking and resulted in an “increasing number of 
foreign national survivors . . . afraid to report their cases to law 
enforcement, pursue immigration options, or seek services . . . .”.184  
II. THE “SHALLOW STATE” 
A. Trafficking and the “Shallow State” 
 
These scholarly critiques, while important, fail to adequately 
explain the recent decline in T visa approvals for victims. This Part asserts 
that recent declining T visa approval rates have been largely driven by 
administrative actors, who have erected considerable new roadblocks 
within the T visa application process. Law and society scholars have 
shown how administrative, enforcement, and adjudicatory actors play a 
significant role shaping legal protections.185 Despite “law on the books,” 
the actions of administrative, adjudicatory, and enforcement actors can 
deeply impact “law in action.”186 While not unique to trafficking cases, 
this phenomenon is especially apparent in the T visa context because 
administrative and law enforcement officials play a formative role in 
shaping outcomes.187 This Part focuses on how such low-level 
administrative actors operated in recent years to erect new barriers for 
immigrant victims of trafficking within the T visa application process and 




182 Id. at 1615. 
183 Id. (describing how immigration enforcement efforts, often under the guise of 
combating trafficking, have had “the perhaps unintended effect of reinforcing migrants’ 
vulnerability to exploitation and made them more vulnerable to exploitation”). 
184 See 2020 TIP Report, supra note 24, at 519. 
185 See, e.g., Lauren Edelman & Mark Suchman, The Legal Environments of 
Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 479 (1997). 
186 See Leisy Abrego & Sarah Lakhani, Incomplete Inclusion: Legal Violence and 
Immigrants in Liminal Legal Statuses, LAW & POL’Y 265, 266 (2015) (citing Roscoe 
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910)). 
187 This article focuses primarily on administrative, rather than enforcement, actors and 
their role in limiting immigration protections. However, law enforcement also plays a 
considerable role in shaping outcomes in the T visa context. 
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B. The “Shallow State” Defined 
 
In 2017, David Rothkopf, a professor of international relations, 
defined the term “shallow state”188 to refer to “the antithesis of the deep 
state.”189 The term “deep state” has been the subject of much scholarly 
discussion for decades, but it gained traction under the Trump 
Administration, as scholars and journalists observed how career 
bureaucrats allegedly worked to undermine the objectives of the 
executive.190 Scholars had applied the term “deep state” originally to 
executive officials but more recently it has evolved to apply to a wider 
range of actors, including intelligence, national security, and bureaucratic 
personnel. 191 These figures, many argued, can effectively leverage power 
built over years “to advance their goals regardless of the whims or wants 
of elected public officials.”192  
Legal scholarship has painted a quite polarized picture of deep 
state actors.193 As Rebecca Ingber has observed, some scholars have 
opined about the dangers of a deep state, “conjur[ing] images of shadowy, 
powerful bureaucrats, evoking and stoking fears of the power that has 
 
188 See Rothkopf, supra note 43. Other journalists and scholars have added texture to the 
portrait of the “shallow state.” See, e.g., Rex Nutting, The Shallow State is thriving under 
Trump, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-
shallow-state-is-thriving-under-trump-2018-04-24 [https://perma.cc/XC5T-SD3U] 
(defining the term as: “a withering of the government’s capabilities”); Danielle Shulkin & 
Julia Brooks, Loyalty Above All: The “Shallow State” of the Trump Administration, JUST 
SEC., Nov. 2, 2020, https://www.justsecurity.org/73226/loyalty-above-all-the-shallow-
state-of-the-trump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/TK5F-G4HE] (describing the 
“shallow state” as characterized by “hollowing” out of expertise with many senior 
positions left open and others filled “whose most significant attribute appears to be 
political loyalty to [President Trump] rather than deep experience and professional 
excellence.”).  
189 Rothkopf, supra note 43. 
190 Id. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, The Deep State Is on a Roll, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/02/opinion/trump-fauci-deep-state.html 
[https://perma.cc/VLL7-XM4N] (describing Anthony Fauci as part of the “deep state,” 
which is engaged in a “righteous defense against the corruption of democracy”). 
191 Rothkopf, supra note 43; see Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the National 
Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139, 143 (2018); see also MARC AMBINDER & D.B. 
GRADY, DEEP STATE: INSITE THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY INDUSTRY 4 (2013); MIKE 
LOFGREN, THE DEEP STATE: THE FALL OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE RISE OF A SHADOW 
GOVERNMENT 34–36 (2016); Peggy Noonan, The Deep State, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 28, 2013, 
9:10 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-233B-134 [https://perma.cc/83Q5-GCHJ]. A 
wide range of scholars have been concerned about power outside of the national security 
apparatus wielded by unelected bureaucratic actors in the administrative state. See, e.g., 
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 17 (2008) (examining the constitutional origins of a 
unitary Executive). 
192 Rothkopf, supra note 43. 
193 See Ingber, supra note 197, at 143. 
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accrued in the executive branch’s national security bureaucracy.”194 
Others have viewed the deep state as a source of “benevolent internal 
constraints,” providing an important check on the Executive and a 
safeguard for the “legitimacy of the administrative state.”195  
Rothkopf, however, warned of the rise of a different 
phenomenon—the shallow state. The shallow state, as he conceived it, 
refers to administrative officials who “actively eschew[ed] experience, 
knowledge, relationships, insight, craft, special skills, tradition, and shared 
values.”196 These actors, unlike the deep state, use the administrative state 
and their knowledge of decision- and rulemaking instrumentally to serve 
the objectives of the Executive. They often remain untethered to statutory 
or regulatory goals and texts, and they mobilize their knowledge and skills 
to undermine the statutory regime.197  
C. Immigration Law and the “Shallow State” 
 
This article is particularly focused on the actions of low-level 
bureaucrats working to the immigration context.198 It deploys the term 
 
194 Id. at 144. 
195 See id. at 142–44. 
196 Rothkoft, supra note 43.  
197 See Sarah Isgur, Opinion: We in the ‘Shallow State’ Thought We Could Help. Instead, 
We Obscured the Reality of a Trump Presidency, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2020).  
198 While not the focus of this article, scholars and journalists have also defined the 
shallow state as hollowing out of the agency and the lack of competency in administrative 
agencies. See Shulkin & Brooks, supra note 194. Critics remarked how President Trump 
appointed less competent, less experienced officials, such as Stephen Miller, Kirstjen 
Nielsen, and Ken Cuccinelli, to prominent roles within the immigration system. See id. 
Some of these political appointments, such as that of Ken Cuccinelli and Chad Wolf, the 
former director of USCIS, have been patently unlawful and later found by federal district 
courts to violate the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. See id.; see also James Doubek, 
Judge Says Ken Cuccinelli Was Appointed Unlawfully To Top Immigration Post, NPR 
(Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/01/811023475/judge-says-ken-cuccinelli-
was-appointed-unlawfully-to-top-immigration-post [https://perma.cc/W8KC-LR3B]; 
Dennis Romero, Federal judge rules acting DHS head Chad Wolf unlawfully appointed, 
invalidates DACA suspension, NBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/federal-judge-rules-acting-dhs-head-
chad-wolf-unlawfully-appointed-n1247848 [https://perma.cc/Y5Y5-3WRV]. Meanwhile, 
some critics have observed an overall brain drain, as experienced officials have left 
USCIS and the immigration court system, hollowing out the agency and reducing its 
capacity to effectively adjudicate immigration applications. See, e.g., TRAC, MORE 
IMMIGRATION JUDGES LEAVING THE BENCH (July 13, 2020), 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/617/ [https://perma.cc/EKX9-CBK7] (“Turnover 
[in immigration judges] is the highest since records began in FY 1997 over two decades 
ago.”); Louise Radnofsky, High Turnover Roils Trump’s Immigration-Policy Ranks, 
WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/high-turnover-roils-trumps-
immigration-policy-ranks-11560355978 [https://perma.cc/SK7F-KDP5] (“In the past two 
months, almost every top job on immigration policy has turned over once—and in some 
cases, twice—with the administration at times employing creative maneuvers to get 
officials in place.”). 
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“bureaucrat” to refer to frontline workers in an administrative agency.199 
Sociologists have defined “bureaucrat” in an expansive sense, including a 
broad range of professional workers, including technocrats, policy makers, 
and front-line or “street level” decisionmakers.200 United by a common 
culture, these bureaucrats have considerable knowledge and expertise.201 
They also have broad discretion and exercise considerable power within 
the administrative agency.202 In the immigration context, while 
bureaucratic actors can be found in various agencies at the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, this article focuses on bureaucratic 
actors at USCIS. USCIS officers adjudicate immigration applications and 
implement agency guidance. In these roles, they have power to decide the 
fates of immigrant applicants and also informally shape policy that leads 
to large-scale administrative change. 
Often, bureaucrats are pictured as rather parochial office 
workers—resistant to change—and often responsible for repressive 
policies.203 Yet, recent literature has painted a more optimistic view of  
bureaucrats.204 Bureaucrats can engage in “bottom up” innovation that 
positively impacts rights claims and resists presidential encroachment. 
Indeed, as Michael Lipsky observed, street level actors can have such 
significant discretion that they function as “policymakers in their 
 
199 Michael Lipsky, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMNAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
PUBLIC SERVICES xi, 3 (reprt. 2010). 
200 Id.  
201 Id.  
202 MAX WEBER, BUREAUCRATIC THEORY 1393 (1978) (“In a modern state the actual ruler 
is necessarily and unavoidably the bureaucracy, since power is exercised neither through 
parliamentary speeches nor monarchial enunciations but through the routines of 
administration.”); Larry B. Hill, Who Governs the American Administrative State? A 
Bureaucratic-Centered Image of Governance, 1 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 
261,  266 (1991) (“[B]ureaucracy is a significant actor in the governance process, and the 
bureaucratic actor is able to rely upon a set of strategic advantages and power bases… and 
exercises an important degree of discretion.”); Lipsky, supra note 199 at 13 (“The policy-
making roles of streetlevel bureaucrats are built upon two interrelated facets of their 
positions: relatively high degrees of discretion and relative autonomy from organizational 
authority.”). 
203 See, e.g., Marie-Amélie George, Bureaucratic Agency: Administering the 
Transformation of LGBT Rights, 36 YALE L. & POL. REV. 83, 83 (2017) (“In the 1940s and 
1950s, the federal administrative state was a powerful engine of discrimination against 
homosexuals, with bureaucratic officials implementing anti-gay policies that reinforced 
homosexuals’ subordinate social and legal status.”). 
204 See, e.g., George, supra note 203 (describing how bottom up innovation can improve 
LGBTQ+ rights claims); Tatiana Camelia Dogaru, Street-Level Bureaucrats as Innovative 
Strategists: An Analytic Approach, 12 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. 51 (2017) (demonstrating how 
street level bureaucracy can be beneficial as such actors can effectively adapt policy as 
they implement it); compare Richard Weatherley and Michael Lipsky, Street-level 
Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special Education Reform, 47:2 
HARV. ED. REV. 171 (1977) [hereinafter Street-level Bureaucrats] (examining how street 
level actors resisted special education reform in Massachusetts). 
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respective work arenas.”205 Marie-Amélie George, for example, has 
observed how bureaucratic actors, despite top down policies restricting the 
rights of LGBTQ+ individuals, worked to cement more protective policies 
and practices.206 Similarly, in the immigration context, Joseph Landau has 
observed how bureaucratic actors in the Obama Administration worked 
creatively to implement prosecutorial discretion initiatives by channeling 
feedback upwards to mid- and top-level officials to quickly improve 
protections for immigrants.207  
Bottom up innovation clearly has some benefits.208 It allows 
bureaucratic actors to marshal on-the-ground experience and make better 
decisions on individual matters because they can weigh the unique facts 
before them. Bureaucrats also can share lessons upwards to influence 
policy makers and tweak policies that are not working effectively.209  In 
addition, bottom up action can contribute to "administrative common 
law," the common corpus of law and policy within the administrative 
agency.210  
Despite these considerable advantages, however, there are 
drawbacks to bottom up bureaucratic innovation. While low-level 
bureaucrats can mobilize their knowledge and expertise to support policies 
that protect minority rights, they can also support repressive policies. As 
Landau acknowledges, innovation by bureaucratic actors is not a “one-
way racket.”211 Rather, it is capable of “produc[ing] a set of very different, 
immigrant-unfriendly directives as opposed to the current, more 
immigrant-affirming ones.”212 Indeed, the very same practices of low-level 
 
205 Street-level Bureaucrats, supra note 199, at 172. 
206 George, supra note 203, at 84-85 (“[B]y the mid1980s many bureaucrats had become 
incidental allies, subverting bans on gay and lesbian foster and adoptive parenting and 
promoting gay-inclusive curricula in public schools.”). 
207 Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law, 
65 DUKE L. J. 1173 (2016) (arguing that this on-the-ground experimentation led to better 
results, as officers could exercise discretion and engage in subregulatory guidance to 
improve initiatives quickly and effectively). 
208 I define “bottom up” action to occur when frontline workers, exercising the discretion 
given to them by the agency and top-down directives, shape policies on the ground and 
then, communicate with mid- or top-level officials to shape policy. 
209 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 201, at 268 (describing how bureaucratic actors are influenced 
by extrabureaucratic actors, but they also can “act so as to influence the other actors”). As 
Landau points out, low-level actors may, at times, favor subregulatory or nonlegislative 
rules of notice-and-comment rulemaking, which although less transparent, can result in 
quicker, beneficial outcomes. Landau, supra note 207, at 1232. He offers the example of 
bureaucratic action during the Obama administration to issue sub regulatory guidance on 
Deferred Action applications that ultimately benefited immigration applicants. Id. 
210 Landau, supra note 207, at 1233-34 (“Perhaps most significant is that frontline officers 
can report the effectiveness of their experimentation up the chain of command and better 
enable policymakers to make positive choices regarding ex ante and ex post controls across 
entire agencies or even entire regulatory fields.”). 
211 Id. at 1232. 
212 Id. 
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bureaucratic actors that can encourage innovation, like the replacement of 
notice-and -comment rulemaking with subregulatory or nonlegislative 
rules, can fuel unlawful, harmful policies, especially without effective 
oversight.213  
It is against this landscape that we view the shallow state. The 
shallow state is characterized by low-level bureaucratic actors who are 
mobilized or encouraged by an Executive. They are engaged in 
innovation, but of a type that represses or limits rights, and without 
sufficient oversight. It is in this context that administrative actors at 
USCIS under the Trump Administration deployed subregulatory guidance 
and exercised discretion to reject, delay, and deny immigration 
applications. It is here that these same actors experimented with new 
policies to add friction to the immigration application process. And when 
some policies were found to be unlawful, these actors were able to quickly 
pivot and try new policies and practices to achieve similar results.  
Under the Trump Administration, bureaucratic actors used these 
tactics to restrict access to important immigration benefits, ranging from 
asylum to T visas to Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”). 
The T visa context is but one example, but it is a particularly strident 
example, as former President Trump publicly expressed his deep 
commitment to trafficking victims. Yet, privately, the Administrative 
oversaw low-level administrative actors to significantly erode protections 
for immigrant victims. 
D. Tactics of the “Shallow State” 
 
“We’ve had the Trafficking Victims Protection Act since 2000. 
In those 19 years, an entire infrastructure has been constructed 
to support trafficking survivors. And piece by piece, the Trump 
administration is eroding and undermining that edifice of 
protection.”214 
  
-Martina Vandenberg, Human Trafficking Legal Center 
 
This Part examines the tactics of administrative actors within the 
shallow state in the T visa context. It highlights a number of strategies 
used by such actors, including: (1) increasing the stakes for immigrant 
victims; (2) rejecting new applications; (3) causing delay; (4) increasing 
requests for evidence and denials based on misinterpretations of law and 
 
213 Id. (arguing that under the Obama Administration, the president exercised careful 
control over low-level bureaucrat but warning that this oversight might not always be 
present). 
214 How Trump Is ‘Destroying Protections’ for Victims of Human Trafficking, WORLD 
POL. REV. (July 2, 2019), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/27998/under-
trump-human-trafficking-protections-have-weakened [https://perma.cc/PR9J-DG52]. 
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regulations; and (5) expanding the role of “darkside discretion.” This Part 
shows how these actions of the “shallow state” have worked in concert to 
undermine the T visa program and harm immigrant victims of trafficking.  
1. Heightened Stakes 
 
In 2018, USCIS raised the stakes for all immigrant victim applying 
for a T visa. Previously, if applicants were denied a T visa, they were not 
placed in removal (deportation) proceedings.215 This policy, in place for 
over fifteen years, encouraged immigrant victims, who may be fearful of 
deportation, to come forward and apply for immigration protection.  
However, in November 2018, USCIS quickly reversed course. In a 
policy memorandum, USCIS announced that applicants who were denied 
T visas would be issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), the charging 
document in immigration court, and placed in removal proceedings.216 
This policy change came amidst new guidance by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) dramatically altering enforcement priorities 
and making clear that no one, including immigrant victims, was off the 
table in terms of immigration enforcement.217 ICE, established by 
Congress in 2003, was historically the enforcement branch of the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security,218 but this new guidance effectively 
transformed USCIS, the benefit-granting agency into an enforcement 
agency.219 
 
215 USCIS, UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR THE REFERRAL OF CASES AND ISSUANCE OF NOTICES 
TO APPEAR (NTAS) IN CASES INVOLVING INADMISSIBLE AND DEPORTABLE ALIENS, PM-
602-0050.1 (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-28-
PM-602-0050.1-Guidance-for-Referral-of-Cases-and-Issuance-of-NTA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E3HH-L2KV]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2019 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 
REPORT: UNITED STATES 488 (June 2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R9G5-5E5F] [hereinafter 2019 TIP REPORT] (“As of November 2018, 
DHS may issue NTAs to individuals following the denial of a T visa or denial of 
adjustment of status from a T visa to permanent resident status, if such individuals are 
unlawfully present at that time of denial.”). 
216 Id. 
217 See DHS, Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration 
Enforcement Improvements Policies (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-
Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FUA4-8S2C] (expanding border security and enforcement efforts); 
DHS, Enforcement of the Immigration Laws to Serve the National Interest (Feb. 20, 
2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-
the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG47-
GGGA] (describing new policies to significantly expanding immigration enforcement 
priorities). 
218 See supra note 88 regarding the agencies within the Department of Homeland Security. 
219 See, e.g., Joshua Breisblatt, USCIS Is Slowly Being Morphed Into an Immigration 
Enforcement Agency, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Jul. 9, 2018), 
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The policy had an immediate chilling effect.220 Applications for T 
visas decreased by 23 percent after the announcement.221 Meanwhile, 
USCIS began to issue NTAs and place applicants in removal 
proceedings.222 Martina Vandenberg, founder of a leading national anti-
trafficking NGO, called the risk of deportation “a game-changer.”223 She 
noted that it “totally changes the analysis of whether or not it’s worth it for 
any trafficking victim to cooperate with law enforcement.”224 Deborah 
Pembrook, a trafficking survivor who assists survivors with T visa 
applications, stated, “We hear time and time again: Why would I risk 
myself? Why would I risk my family?”225 
2. Rejection 
 
As USCIS increased the risk of deportation, the agency also 
exerted greater control over the entry point for new T visa applications. It 
did this by strenuously policing the content, substance, and format of T 
visa applications. In particular, USCIS issued two new policies that 
increased the burden on initial T visa applicants. One policy reduced 
access to fee waivers, and the other required that all blanks on the 
application be filled. Applications that failed to meet these new 
requirements were summarily rejected.226  
Fee Waiver Policy. In 2018, USCIS abruptly tightened the 
qualifications for waivers and increased the filing fees for certain 
applications associated with the T visa.227 While the T visa itself does not 
 
https://immigrationimpact.com/2018/07/09/uscis-guidance-immigration-
benefit/#.YLqD7TZKj-Z (describing the NTA memo as a “major shift in how USCIS 
operates” because “USCIS was never meant to be tasked with immigration enforcement”). 
220 See, e.g., AM. IMMIGR. LAWS. ASSOC., AILA POLICY BRIEF: NEW USCIS NOTICE TO 
APPEAR GUIDANCE (Doc. No. 18071739, Aug. 8, 2018) (“The new NTA policy will also 
have a chilling effect on legal immigration in general, discouraging many people who are 
eligible for immigration benefits from applying out of fear they will be subject to 
unjustified enforcement.”); see also Dystopian Fiction, supra note 44 (“[Since then,] 
[a]pplications for the special visas have nose-dived.”). 
221 Contrera, supra note 11. 
222 See Breisblatt, supra note 219 (describing how immediately following the issuance of 
the NTA guidance USCIS began issuing NTAs, whereas previously this was the duty of 
ICE). 
223 See Gordon, supra note 34. 
224 Id. 
225 Contrera, supra note 11. 
226 Due to lack of transparency, the exact impact on T visa applicants is unknown. However, 
USCIS has disclosed initial data in response to FOIA litigation to show that in the U visa 
context, there was a dramatic increase in rejections. See infra notes 252 to 254. 
227 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(l)(7); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC, PM602-0011.1, FEE WAIVER GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED BY THE FINAL RULE OF 
USCIS FEE SCHEDULE: REVISIONS TO ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL (AFM) CHAPTER 
10.9, AFM Update AD11-26 (2011) [hereinafter FEE WAIVER GUIDELINES] (describing 
eligibility criteria for fee waiver requests, including evidence of very low-income). In the 
summer of 2018, “[n]umerous practitioners . . . reported a significant increase in fee 
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require a fee, many applicants must submit a “waiver of inadmissibility” 
with the T visa application. 228 This waiver, as of this writing, requires a 
filing fee of $930.229  
Many trafficking victims depended heavily on fee waiver 
applications as a means to access the T visa because they could not 
otherwise afford the filing fee of $930. Since the TVPA was passed, 
USCIS has had a generous practice of granting fee waivers to trafficking 
victims.230 T visa applicants, for example, have historically been able to 
 
waiver denials from the Vermont Service Center in . . . U visa . . . applications.” Letter 
from Cecelia Friedman Levin, Sr. Pol’y Couns., ASISTA, to Maureen Dunn, Chief, Fam. 
Immigr. and Victim Prot. Div., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec. (July 30, 2018), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Sq_CtrhuAiiKGayzsT9wQld3ZglmFfFK/view 
[https://perma.cc/N8PQ-DPPN]; see, e.g., ASISTA, PRACTICE ADVISORY: FEE WAIVERS 
FOR VAWA SELF-PETITIONS, U AND T VISA APPLICATIONS (2018), 
https://asistahelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ASISTA-Practice-Advisory-Fee-
Waivers.pdf [https://perma.cc/99LE-DDAB] [hereinafter ASISTA FEE WAIVERS] 
(“Practitioners nationwide have recently reported significant rates of fee-waiver denials 
from the Humanitarian Division of the Vermont Service Center.”); IMMIGRANT LEGAL 
RES. CTR., FEE WAIVERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON IMMIGRANT SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT, AND OTHER CRIMES (2018), 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/fee_waiver_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z7Y2-XNVK] (“[In 2018,] [a]dvocates for survivors throughout the 
country reported high numbers of fee waiver request rejections, in cases that clearly met 
established fee waiver eligibility criteria.”). 
228 See ASISTA FEE WAIVERS, supra note 222; ASISTA, USCIS FEE RULE & THE 
IMPACT ON SURVIVOR-BASED PROTECTIONS (August 4, 2020) at 3, 
https://asistahelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Fee-Rule-Survivor-Protections.pdf 
(“VAWA self-petitioners, and U and T visa applicants must often file ancillary forms that 
do have significant fees, which would rise exponentially . . . .”). 
229 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM I-192. APPLICATION 
FOR ADVANCE PERMISSION TO ENTER AS A NONIMMIGRANT, 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-192instr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T7SJ-HM93] (last updated Dec. 2, 2019). 
230 ASISTA FEE WAIVERS, supra note 227, at 1 (citing INS, Petition to Classify Alien as 
Immediate Relative of a United States Citizen or as a Preference Immigrant; Self-
Petitioning for Certain Battered or Abused Spouses and Children, 61 Fed. Reg. 13061, 
13069 (Mar. 29, 1996), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1996-03-26/pdf/96-7219.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9USL-KTJY]; see also New Classification for Victims of Criminal 
Activity; Eligibility for ‘‘U’’ Nonimmigrant Status; Interim Rule 72 Fed. Reg. 53014, 
53021 (Sept. 17, 2007), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2007-09-17/pdf/E7-
17807.pdf [https://perma.cc/45HJ-7JWN]; Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of 
Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility for “T” Nonimmigrant Status, 81 Fed. Reg 92266, 
92288 (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-12-19/pdf/2016-
29900.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AEW-WG6N] (discussing fee waiver history in T visa 
context). In 2008, Congress required that the Department of Homeland Security allow 
certain applicants, including applicants for T visas, to qualify for fee waivers in the 
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008. 
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 
110-457, § 201(d)(7) (2008). By regulation, USCIS further specified that discretionary 
fee waivers are available if the requestor cannot pay the fee and that such a waiver must 
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qualify for a fee waiver by demonstrating that they received a means-
tested benefit,231 have income less than 125% of the federal poverty 
guidelines, or meet other criteria.232 However, on September 27, 2018, 
USCIS announced that it planned to revise the fee waiver form—Form I-
912, Request for Fee Waiver.233 At the same time, USCIS announced a 
plan to significantly raise the fees for immigration applications. The 
proposed amendment summarily prohibited applicants who receive a 
means-tested benefit from qualifying for a fee waiver.234 USCIS stated, in 
support of this policy, that the rationale was “inconsistent income levels 
being used” by states to determine eligibility for means-tested benefits.235  
Advocates, lawyers, scholars, and activists raised significant 
concerns about the proposed fee waiver policy.236 They warned that the 
rule would have dramatic implications, significantly reducing application 
rates.237 Several commentators also noted that “the language runs counter 
to existing law” as Congress explicitly exempted T visa applicants from 
fees.238 Others described how the new fee guidance would make victims 
more vulnerable to abuse, as they will have “turn to jobs with exploitative 
employers or back to traffickers” to pay their filing fees.239 USCIS, 
however, refused to change course and began implementation of the 
policy. 
 
be “consistent with the status or benefit sought”—thus might not be appropriate if the 
underlying immigration benefit requires that the immigrant demonstrate, for example, a 
“substantial financial investment.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(c)(1).  
231 8 C.F.R. § 103.7(c)(1). 
232 USCIS, INSTRUCTIONS FOR REQUEST FOR FEE WAIVER 4–5 (last updated: 10/15/2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/i-912instr-pc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L8BD-79NW] (describing the eligibility standards for USCIS fee 
waivers).  
233 USCIS, PROPOSED I-912 FEE WAIVER FORM REVISION (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/proposed-i-912-fee-waiver-form-revision 
[https://perma.cc/QSK9-D8WV]. 
234 Allison Davenport, Fee Waivers: Status of Proposed Changes, ASISTA 3 (2019), 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/fee_waiver_update-final-12.16.19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZDD3-CE9K]. 
235 Agency Information Collection Activities; Revision of a Currently Approved 
Collection: Request for Fee Waiver; Exemptions, 83 FR 49120, 49121 (Sept. 20, 2018). 
236 See Agency Information Collection Activities; Revision of a Currently Approved 
Collection: Request for Fee Waiver; Exemptions 84 Fed. Reg. 26137, 26138 (June 5, 
2019) (providing notice of what changes the agency was making); U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services Fee Schedule and Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit 
Request Requirements, 85 Fed. Reg. 46794-889 (Aug. 3, 2020) (summarizing and 
responding to comments submitted during notice-and-comment rulemaking process). 
237 See IMMIGR. POL’Y LAB, Reducing Red Tape Allows More People to Become Citizens 
for Free, https://immigrationlab.org/project/reducing-red-tape-allows-people-become-
citizens-free/ [https://perma.cc/YUN2-576U] (forecasting decrease by 10 percent of 
citizenship applications). 
238 See 85 Fed. Reg. at 46810.  
239 Id. at 46816. 
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In 2019, immigrant advocacy organizations filed three federal 
lawsuits challenging the new fee waiver policy as unlawful.240 Public 
Citizen, representing Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, alleged that the 
new fee waiver form violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) 
due to its failure to undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking.241 Plaintiffs 
further asserted that the new fee waiver guidance was arbitrary and 
capricious in violation of the APA, and violated provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).242 On October 8, 2020, the 
federal court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, granting plaintiffs’ motion for 
a preliminary injunction and issuing a stay of the rule’s effective date.243 
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and found that they were likely to 
succeed on the claim that the rule was arbitrary and capricious under the 
APA.244 As a result of the injunction, USCIS stopped applying the new fee 
waiver guidance.245 
“No Spaces” Policy. Within weeks of this national injunction, 
USCIS issued a new, simple online alert:246 effective immediately, USCIS 
would reject all applications that had a blank field, even if the field was 
not applicable.247 This “no spaces” policy required that all blank fields be 
completed with “N/A” or “None.” As justification, USCIS cited federal 
regulations that require that “applications filed with USCIS must be 
 
240 See City of Seattle v. DHS, No. 3:19-CV-07151-MMC (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2019); 
Nw. Immigrant Rts. Project v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. CV 19-
3283 (RDM), 2020 WL 5995206 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-5369, 
2021 WL 161666 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 2021).; Project Citizenship v. DHS, No. 1:20-cv-
11545-NMG (D. Mass. Sept. 17, 2020).  
241 Complaint for Declarative and Injunctive Relief, Nw. Immigrant Rts. Project v. United 
States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. CV 19-3283 (RDM), 2020 WL 5995206 
(D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2020).  
242 Id.  
243 Nw. Immigrant Rts. Project v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. CV 
19-3283 (RDM), 2020 WL 5995206 at 75 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2020) (order granting 
preliminary injunction). 
244 Id. 
245 Docket, Nw. Immigrant Rts. Project v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 
CV 19-3283 (RDM), 2020 WL 5995206 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2020). 
246 See Catherine Rampell, This latest trick from the Trump administration is one of the 
most despicable yet, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2020, 4:24 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-trump-administrations-kafkaesque-new-
way-to-thwart-visa-applications/2020/02/13/190a3862-4ea3-11ea-bf44-
f5043eb3918a_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q8AJ-L2GH] (“The policy change, at first 
affecting just asylum applicants, was announced without fanfare on the USCIS website 
sometime in the fall.”). The “no spaces” policy applied initially to asylum and U visa 
applications, then eventually to T visa applications. Id. USCIS also extended the “no 
spaces” policy to law enforcement certifications, stating that certifying officials also 
could not leave a field blank, or the entire T or U visa applications would be rejected. 
See, e.g., T visa USCIS alert, supra note 248.  
247 Id. 
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properly completed, submitted, and executed in accordance with the 
applicable form instructions.”248 
Advocates decried the policy as disastrous for immigrant 
victims.249 Some argued that the policy was colored by bad intent, 
transforming immigration forms into “minefields, intentionally designed 
to entrap the unsuspecting.”250 Others argued that the “no spaces” policy 
lacked a cogent policy rationale and would harm the most vulnerable by 
immediately (and without notice) rejecting their applications.251 USCIS, 
however, maintained that the policy was consistent with its authority to 
determine what constituted a “completed” application.  
The exact impact on T visa applicants is still unknown because 
USCIS has yet to release the number of T visa applicants who experienced 
rejections due to the policy or respond to a FOIA request by the author. 
However, evidence in the U visa context signals the scope of the 
impact.252 In the first three months of the policy, approximately 98% of U 
visa petitions were rejected within three months of the new “no spaces” 
policy.253 Within nine months, almost 12,000 U visa petitions were 
 
248 USCIS, Application for T Nonimmigrant Status, https://www.uscis.gov/i-914; see 8 
CFR 103.2(a)(1); 8 CFR 103.2(b)(1). In particular, in guidance posted on the USCIS 
website, “you must provide a response to all required questions, even if the response is 
“none,” “unknown,” or “n/a.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OMBUDSMAN ALERT: 
USCIS PUBLISHES ALERT FOR FORM I-914 (March 24, 2020) [hereinafter T visa USCIS 
alert]. The guidance noted that applications for T visas will be rejected “that has, for 
example, an empty field for gender, other names used, marital status, current immigration 
status, information about a spouse or child, or tables not completed where appropriate.” 
Id.  
249 See, e.g., Charles Davis, Bureaucracy as Weapon: how the Trump Administration is 
Slowing Asylum Cases, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/dec/23/us-immigration-trump-asylum-seekers [https://perma.cc/A9WK-
NUZW] (describing how the new “no spaces” policy had a devastating impact on asylum 
applicants).  
250 See Dystopian Fiction, supra note 46. 
251 For example, on February 6, 2020, ASISTA, a national advocacy organization, 
described the implications of the USCIS policy, noting that “this significant shift in 
policy and practice creates enormous hardship for survivors and their families, and strains 
valuable resources for service providers.” ASISTA, PRACTICE ADVISORY: USCIS FORM 
ALERT: BLANK SPACES ON FORM I-918, PETITION FOR U NONIMMIGRANT STATUS, at 7 
(Feb. 2020), https://asistahelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/I-918-Practice-Alert-3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K4MX-Y85N] [hereinafter ASISTA Practice Advisory]; ASISTA 
Letter to Mark Koumans & Michael Dougherty Feb 6, 2020 (noting how USCIS failed to 
provide “any justification or rationale for this drastic and sudden change, which 
needlessly undermines a survivor’s access to critical immigration benefits designed by a 
bipartisan majority in Congress for their protection”). 
252ASISTA & Urban Justice Center, Practice Advisory: Insight into USCIS’s Application 
of the “No-Blanks” Policy to U-Visa Petitions at 2, AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N (Doc. No. 
20112341) (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-practice-pointers-and-
alerts/practice-advisory-insight-into-usciss-application [https://perma.cc/M74V-K23F] 
[hereinafter AILA Blank Space Practice Advisory].  
253 Id. 
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returned.254 While such applicants could reapply, some missed important 
filing deadlines; for others, it further delayed their pursuit for protection. 
On November 19, 2020, NGOs filed a federal lawsuit challenging 
the “no spaces” policy.255 In Vangala v. USCIS, plaintiffs alleged that the 
“no spaces” policy “led to absurd and unfairly prejudicial results.”256 They 
further asserted the policy violated the APA by failing to subject to engage 
in notice-and-comment rulemaking.257 Plaintiffs also argued that it was 
“arbitrary and capricious.”258 The litigation was successful, as it prompted 
settlement negotiations with USCIS.259 USCIS eventually agreed to stop 
implementation of the “no spaces” policy, beginning on December 24, 
2020, and President Biden swiftly repealed the policy upon entering 
office.260 However, these changes did little to erase the harm already 
experienced by applicants. 
3. Delay 
 
 As USCIS raised the bars to entry, the agency significantly slowed 
the adjudication process for T visas. From 2015 to 2019, the processing 
times for adjudication increased dramatically from 7.99 months to 17.9 
months.261 As of May 10, 2021, USCIS estimated the processing time for 
T visas as seventeen months to twenty-nine months.262 Delays meant that 
immigrant victims of trafficking, most without access to employment 
authorization, had to both survive and avoid deportation for even longer, 
in order to potentially receive a T visa.  
The USCIS Ombudsman’s Office found the increased processing 
times alarming. In a 2020 report to Congress, the office noted that 
adjudication delays were generally a “critical question.”263 The Office 
pointedly asked USCIS to describe more transparently how it was 
 
254 Id. 
255 Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 2, Vangala v. USCIS, 
No. 3:20-cv-08143 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 19, 2020).  
256 Id. at 2.  
257 Id. at 3. 
258 Id. 
259 AM. IMMIGR. LAWS. ASS’N, Practice Alert: USCIS Agrees to Stop Rejecting 
Applications and Petitions for Blank Spaces as of December 28, 2020 (Doc. No. 20122100, 
Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-practice-pointers-and-alerts/uscis-
blank-spaces [https://perma.cc/6LBY-Z88Y]. 
260 Id. 
261 See chart on file with author based on analysis of U.S. Department of State 
Trafficking in Persons Reports. 
262 Check Case Processing Times, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., 
https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/ [https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/] (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2020). 
263 OFFICE OF THE CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 8 (2020), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0630_cisomb-2020-annual-
report-to-congress.pdf. 
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“managing benefits applications from vulnerable populations (such as 
victims of human trafficking), where prolonged waiting periods could 
potentially endanger the applicant’s safety.”264 Many trafficking victims 
risked losing access to time-limited specialized case management services 
for trafficking survivors as the processing times extended.265 Victims in 
removal proceedings found it more challenging to obtain continuances and 
stave off a potential removal order. Some were even removed. At the same 
time, many victims, who were vulnerable to revictimization and reprisals 
from traffickers, were left more vulnerable to exploitation.266  
4. Narrow Misinterpretation 
 
As T visa applicants faced delay and new risks of removal, 
USCIS issued more requests for evidence and more denials, rigidly 
interpreted existing standards, contrary to existing law and 
regulations.267 USCIS demanded greater evidence to meet existing 
standards and, in some cases, interpreted existing law to establish a de 
facto statute of limitations, effectively limiting who could qualify for 
the T visa. For example, Emelia, a victim of sex trafficking, waited 
over ten years to apply for the T visa because she was not aware of the 
T visa and also faced immense trauma, stigma, and shame.268 Despite 
evidence that victims of trafficking often delay initial reporting, due to 
stigma and shame, USCIS responded by denying her application 
because she failed to report to law enforcement or apply for the T visa 
immediately after her victimization.269 
Emilia’s case was not unique. Advocates noted a particularly 
pronounced shift in adjudication trends in 2017 related to the “on 
account of” requirement.270 To qualify for a T visa, the applicant must 
 
264 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
USCIS RESPONSE TO THE CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES OMBUDSMAN’S 2020 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2020). 
265 2020 TIP Report, supra note 24, at 518 (“Advocates expressed concern with lengthy 
and increasing T visa processing times, citing added vulnerabilities for survivors who 
lack legal status or whose time-limited support services expire.”). 
266 Id. 
267 2019 TIP REPORT, supra note 215, at 487 (“NGOs reported increased obstacles to 
obtaining a T visa, noting a rising number of requests for additional evidence by 
adjudicators, including requests that referred to outdated regulations, and called for 
improved training for adjudicators.”); 2020 TIP Report, supra note 24, at 518 
(“Advocates again reported increased obstacles to obtaining a T visa.”). 
268 Emelia is a pseudonym for a client who was represented by the BU Law Immigrants’ 
Rights and Human Trafficking Program. Her name has been changed to protect her 
identity.  
269 Redacted denial notice on file with author. 
270 See Complaint at 10, Doe v. Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020) (In 
2017, without any formal announcement or rule-making process, Defendant USCIS started 
denying bona fide T visa applications, like the applications denied above, claiming the 
applicant needs to prove that the trafficking was the reason the applicant was still in the 
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show that she is in the United States “on account” of the trafficking.271 
This ground requires that the victim demonstrate that they have been: 
 
physically present in the United States, American Samoa, or 
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or at a 
port of entry thereto, on account of such trafficking, 
including physical presence on account of the alien having 
been allowed entry into the United States for participation in 
investigative or judicial processes associated with an act or 
a perpetrator of trafficking.272  
 
Whereas USCIS previously interpreted this requirement broadly, the 
agency transformed this requirement into a de facto statute of 
limitations, denying applications for survivors of trafficking who 
failed to file their T visa application within a few years of escaping 
their trafficking experience.273 
USCIS has historically interpreted the “on account of” requirement 
broadly to mean that the trafficking occurred in the United States and that 
the victim has not departed from the United States since the trafficking 
occurred.274 USCIS, in 2017, however, without notice or guidance, moved 
to dramatically narrow its interpretation of the “on account of” ground.275 
In particular, USCIS interpreted the requirement as a filing deadline, in the 
absence of any statutory or regulatory guidance.276 
This troubling shift came after 2016 agency regulations that 
decreased the burdens on applicants to meet the “on account of” 
requirement. Previously, to meet the “on account of” ground, applicants 
had to show they had no “clear chance to leave the United States, or an 
 
United States.”) Advocates also reported unlawful requests and denials related to other T 
visa requirements. See 2019 TIP REPORT, supra note 215, at 487 (describing how advocates 
have documented increased requests and denials in cases involving polyvictimization, such 
as domestic violence and human trafficking, as well as on the “on account” of ground). 
271 INA §101(a)(15)(T)(i). 
272 INA § 101(a)(15)(T)(i)(l) (emphasis added). 
273 See Corie O’Rourke, Cory Sagduyu, and Katherine Soltis, Present Yet Unprotected: 
USCIS’s Misinterpretation of the T Visa’s Physical Presence Requirement and Failure to 
Protect Trafficking Survivors, 3 AILA LAW JOURNAL 53, 54 (April 2021) (describing the 
de facto statute of limitations “despite the absence of any explicit T visa filing deadline in 
the TVPA or federal regulations”). 
274 8 CFR § 214.11(g)(2002).  
275 See Gordon, supra note 34 (quoting Mercer Cauley, the immigration attorney 
representing a victim whose T visa was denied, as saying, “They’re using a technicality 
to revictimize a victim”). 
276 See O’Rourke, supra note 273, at 57 (“USCIS has (1) imposed a de facto filing deadline, 
(2) ignored a regulatory change that removed the previous requirement that T visa 
applicants show they did not have an ‘opportunity to depart’ the United States, (3) failed 
to adopt a trauma-informed approach, and (4) failed to take into consideration key 
provisions of the physical presence requirement.”). 
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‘opportunity to depart.’”277 The regulations eliminated this requirement, 
recognizing that previous narrow interpretations of the “on account” 
ground were “burdensome, vague, and may frustrate congressional 
intent.”278 The change made it easier for applicants to meet the “on 
account of” standard.279  
Yet, in 2017, without notice, USCIS unilaterally moved to restrict 
interpretation of the “on account of” ground.280 The exact contours of this 
change is unknown because USCIS failed to acknowledge any 
interpretation shift or to respond to the author’s Freedom of Information 
Act (“FOIA”) requests regarding the change.281 However, anti-trafficking 
advocates observed that in cases that would have “soared through,” 
applicants received scathing requests for evidence, some of them pages 
long.282 They observed that some included ultra vires language, 
contravening the regulations regarding the “on account of” requirement. 
283 For example, some RFEs stated that the victim must have been 
“recently” liberated by a law enforcement agency, while regulations only 
note that the person has to be “liberated by” such an agency and include 
no time limit.284 Also, the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office 
 
277 See 8 CFR § 214.11(g)(2). Pursuant to this standard, USCIS may consider 
“circumstances attributable to the trafficking in persons situation, such as trauma, injury, 
lack of resources, or travel documents that have been seized by the traffickers.” Id. 
278 Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility for 
“T” Nonimmigrant Status, 81 Fed. Reg. at 92274 (“Commenters also opposed the 
requirement that a victim who escaped the traffickers and remains in the United States 
must show he or she had no clear chance to leave, asserting it is burdensome, vague, and 
may frustrate congressional intent to protect victims.”). Some changes responded to 
statutory changes in the TVPRA. See INA § 101(a)(15)(T)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. 
1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(II) (establishing that immigrant victims who depart the United States 
and re-entry related to the law enforcement investigation may still qualify for T visas). 
279 Id. Also, those who left the United States but re-entered were prohibited from meeting 
the “on account of” requirement, even if their re-entry was to assist law enforcement. Id. 
280 See Complaint at 9, Doe v. Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020) (“In 
2017, without any formal announcement or rule-making process, Defendant USCIS started 
denying bona fide T visa applications, like the applications denied above, claiming 
the applicant needs to prove that the trafficking was the reason the applicant was still in the 
United States.”). 
281 See FOIA requests on file with author. 
282 How Trump Is ‘Destroying Protections’ for Victims of Human Trafficking, supra note 
208. (quoting Martina Vandenberg, who stated, “[R]equests for evidence are much more 
aggressive. Cases that, in the past, might have soared through are now prompting 
multiple-page demands for additional evidence”). 
283 The change came absent any statutory authority for a filing deadline. While adult 
trafficking survivors victimized prior to October 28, 2000, were required to file their T visa 
applications before January 31, 2003, this filing deadline was eliminated by USCIS via 
regulation in 2017. 81 Fed. Reg 92266, 92301-02 (Dec. 19, 2016). Even when this filing 
deadline existed, Congress carved out exceptions, including severe trauma that prevented 
the victim from applying, recognizing the challenges faced by victims of trafficking. 8 
C.F.R. § 214.11(d)(4) (2002). 
284 See O’Rourke, supra note 273, at 58. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3860845




(“AAO”), the body that handles T visa appeals, saw a rise in appeals “on 
account of” requirement.285  
At least one plaintiff challenged the new “on account of” 
interpretations in federal court.286 In August 2020, a T visa applicant, who 
was denied based on the “on account of” ground, filed a federal lawsuit in 
the Western District of North Carolina.287 The complaint alleged that the 
new USCIS interpretation was ultra vires and violated notice and 
comment provisions of the APA.288 The applicant, known only as “Jane 
Doe,” was recruited by a couple in Georgia from Peru to work as a 
domestic worker.289 Eventually, she escaped, but it took her over ten years 
to come forward and apply for a T visa.290 In response, USCIS denied her 
application in February 2020, claiming that she was no longer in the 
United States “on account” of the trafficking.291 While the plaintiff 
eventually withdrew the lawsuit,292 the agency has yet initiate any change 
in the “on account of” interpretation or publicly acknowledge its 
existence. 
5. “Darkside Discretion” 
 
 USCIS also threatened to deliver another deadly blow for T visa 
applicants by changing its standards on discretion in July 2020.293 These 
 
285 See O’Rourke, supra note 273, at 54 (“Appeals to the Administrative Appeals Office 
(AAO) involving physical presence rose sharply following this change in interpretation, 
amounting to nearly one-half of all T visa appeals in 2020.”); Complaint at 8, Doe v. 
Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020) (“A review of the AAO decisions 
concerning USCIS’ denial of T visas based on the presence ‘on account of’ requirement 
shows an increase in appeals filed in 2019requesting [sic] de novo review of the agency’s 
application of the law in this matter.”); see, e.g., Matter of E-T-M-, ID# 3385363 (AAO 
May 8, 2019) (unpublished) (“AAO overturned USCISs denial and found that the 
Applicant's continuous physical presence was directly related to her past trafficking as 
described at 8 C.F.R. § 214.1 l(g)(l)(iv).”); Matter of D-A-A-, ID# 2987735 (AAO Apr. 
3, 2019) (unpublished) (finding that USCIS had erred in denying the claim, noting that 
evidence that the applicant’s significant trauma, including “post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) relating to his trafficking,” “trichotillomania (hair-pulling disorder),” and “major 
depressive disorder, severe, which interferes with his daily life” was sufficient to meet 
the “on account of” standard). 
286 See generally Complaint, Doe v. Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020). 
287 See id. at 9. 
288 Id. at 4.  
289 See Gordon, supra note 34. 
290 Id. 
291 See Complaint at 6, Doe v. Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020). 
292 See Docket, Doe v. Wolf, No. 3:20-cv-00481 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 31, 2020). The author 
filed two Freedom of Information Act requests with USCIS, dated August 7 and 21, 
2020, and as of the date of this writing, has not received a response. (requests on file with 
author). 
293 On July 15, 2020, USCIS published discretion guidance impacting a variety of 
immigration applications at USCIS-PM E.8. See also USCIS, Policy Alert: Applying 
Discretion in USCIS Adjudication (July 15, 2020), 
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new discretion standards, imposed significant, new eligibility 
requirements on applicants, above and beyond existing statutory or 
regulatory requirements.294 They represent a dramatic shift from prior 
guidance, previously in the Adjudicator’s Field Manual, that encouraged 
adjudicators to look to case law and avoid “arbitrary” or “inconsistent” 
decisions based on discretion.295 
Congress intended for the T visas to be a non-discretionary 
immigration benefit.296 Thus, if an applicant meets the statutory 
requirements for the T visa, USCIS must grant the benefit. However, T 
visa applicants were not completely free from the ambit of discretion. 
Most T visa applicants trigger grounds of inadmissibility because they 
entered without inspection, had a prior removal order, or engaged in 
commercial sex, among other reasons.297 Thus, they separate from the T 
visa application must submit a waiver of inadmissibility to receive the T 
visa. This waiver of inadmissibility, unlike the T visa, is expressly 
discretionary and thus governed by new guidance on discretion.298  
Scholars have long critiqued the role of discretion in immigration 
cases.299 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, for example, coined the term 
“darkside discretion” to refer “to a situation where the noncitizen satisfies 
the statutory criteria set by Congress to be eligible for a remedy, but is 
denied by an adjudicator unfairly in the exercise of discretion.”300 She 
argued that discretion should “center on humanitarian concerns and be 
informed by compassion;” thus, discretion as a general matter should be 
“exercised favorably toward the noncitizen” rather than being designed as 
a mechanism to deny or deter immigrant applicants.301  
However, USCIS’s new changes to the Adjudicator’s Field Manual 




294 See Peggy Gleason, USCIS Policy Manual Makes Sweeping Changes to Discretion, 
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER (March 2021), 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/sweeping_changes_in_uscis_policy_ma
nual_for_discretion_3.19.21.pdf (“The changes represent an attempt to impose new 
substantive eligibility requirements on applicants that do not exist in the governing 
statutes or regulations.”). 
295 See USCIS Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) 10.15 (“Like an exercise of discretion, 
a subjective consideration of facts does not mean the decision can be arbitrary, inconsistent 
or dependent upon intangible or imagined circumstance.”). 
296 A non-discretionary benefit is one for which USCIS must grant if the applicant meets 
the statutory requirements.  
297 See generally 8 U.S.C. §1182(a) for inadmissibility grounds. 
298 See 8 C.F.R. § 212.4(c)(1)(viii). 
299 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Darkside Discretion in Immigration Cases, 72 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 367, 369 (2020). 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 367. 
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substantially increase the burdens on applicants.302 For example, the new 
guidance requires that adjudicators use a 22-factor analysis to make any 
discretionary decision, including in the T visa waiver context.303 It 
requires that the immigrant’s file contain a record of the officer’s 
deliberations and the weight given to each factor, whether positive or 
negative.304 It failed to center humanitarian concerns or encourage officers 
to exercise discretion favorably for crime victims. 
Advocates described the discretion policy as “USCIS’s latest 
attempt to leverage bureaucracy to limit access to protections.”305 In a 
comment from 79 organizations serving immigrant survivors, they noted 
“deep[] concern[] about the myriad ways this guidance will foreclose such 
survivors from the humanitarian relief that Congress specifically created 
for them, putting them at risk of continued harm.”306 Advocates described 
how the new discretion policy ran counter to congressional intent, as 
Congress “aim[ed] to spare survivors from being forced to choose between 
living with abuse and facing deportation and possible separation from their 
children.”307 The new guidance also contradicted recent regulations, issued 
in 2016, wherein the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
“acknowledge[d] that victims of trafficking in persons are an especially 
vulnerable population.”308 These “special circumstances of victims,” they 
argued, should be explicitly weighed when deciding waiver 
applications.309 
Significantly, the policy specifically failed to acknowledge that 
trafficking victims—and other vulnerable populations--are more likely to 
trigger negative discretionary factors or have difficulty proving positive 
 
302 USCIS, Policy Alert: Applying Discretion in USCIS Adjudication (July 15, 2020), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-manual-updates/20200715-
Discretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YV9-KFY5]. 
303 Id. The policy made clear that “[f]or benefits involving discretion, a discretionary 
analysis is a separate component of the adjudication of the benefit request; it is typically 
assessed at the end of the review, after an officer has determined that the requestor meets 
all other applicable eligibility requirements.” Id. at 1. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 79 Org. on Behalf of Immigrant Survivors of Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, 
Hum. Trafficking and other Abuses, Joint Comment Submitted in Response to USCIS 
Policy Manual Chapters on Applying Discretion in USCIS Adjudications, 1 USCIS-PM 




307 Id. at 2. Significantly, commenters argued that the discretion policy “undercut[s]” this 
intent “by creating additional documentary requirements based on overbroad 
discretionary factors and by imposing requirements outside the statutory framework for 
survivor-based cases.” Id. 
308 See Classification for Victims of Severe Forms of Trafficking in Persons; Eligibility for 
“T” Nonimmigrant Status, 81 Fed. Reg. at 92284. 
309 Id. 
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factors, merely due to their victimization. Scholars have long recognized 
that victims of sex trafficking, for example, often criminal history related 
to their trafficking or past involvement in commercial sex, both of which 
may trigger inadmissibility. Yet, the new policy asks adjudicators to 
expressly consider and weigh “evidence regarding respect for law and 
order, good character, and the intent to hold family responsibilities.”310 
The guidance further provides no exceptions for victims of trafficking or 
other populations who may, by virtue of their victimization, be less likely 
to demonstrate “good character.” Similarly, the policy asks adjudicators to 
consider the “applicant or beneficiary’s value and service to the 
community,”311 without noting how victims, especially those who have 
been isolated by virtue of their victimization, cannot easily demonstrate 
community engagement.  
III. CONSTRAINTS ON THE “SHALLOW STATE” 
 
The USCIS tactics described above were remarkably effective at altering 
the T visa application process. T visa applicants faced longer wait times, 
increased risk of rejection, additional requests for evidence, a new de facto statute 
of limitations, and heightened risk of denial. If denied, applicants faced a 
heightened risk of deportation. Some were even placed in removal proceedings. 
Also, the policies injected uncertainty about outcomes, and thus had a chilling 
impact, discouraging new immigrant victims from applying for protection.  
In light of these changes, the federal courts, at times, functioned as an 
effective constraint on unlawful administrative action by the shallow state. 
Judicial review exposed some of the USCIS actions as unlawful, provided redress 
for harmed applicants, and in some contexts, stopped the practice altogether. In 
the context of the fee waiver policy, federal litigation resulted in a national 
injunction, which temporarily halted the practice and allowed applicants to 
continue to receive needed fee waivers.312 Similarly, as plaintiffs challenged the 
“no spaces” policy, USCIS agreed to engage in settlement negotiations that, at 
least temporarily, stopped implementation of the policy.313 
However, federal litigation was also an imperfect remedy. It took time. It 
required that the immigrant victims had access to pro bono legal representation, 
which was not always available. Some applicants were placed in removal 
proceedings; others were ordered removed.314 Those in removal proceedings had 
to defend against deportation, some without viable other forms of relief. The 
deported were no longer eligible to pursue the T visa and thus left without 
 
310 See USCIS, Chapter 8: Discretionary Analysis, at 8 (Dec. 15, 2020), 
https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-1-part-e-chapter-8 [https://perma.cc/38QV-
3S8M]. 
311 Id at 7. 
312 See supra Part II.C.2. 
313 Id. 
314 O’Rourke, supra note 273, at 65 (“There have been reports of survivors with pending T 
visa applications or appeals being removed from the United States.”) 
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avenues for redress. Thus, while an important check, judicial review was 
insufficient alone to fully address the harms visited on immigrant victims.  
To address these ongoing gaps in protection, swift action is still needed. 
President Joe Biden immediately took steps in the right direction. On his first day 
in office, DHS rescinded the June 2018 policy memorandum, which called for 
denied T visa applicants to be placed in removal proceedings.315 USCIS then 
ended the “no spaces” policy.316  
Yet, additional efforts are needed. USCIS must end interpretations of the 
“on account of” interpretation that are unlawful and amend discretion policies to 
take account of the lived realities of immigrant victims. USCIS should speed up 
adjudication of T visa applications. Also, improved oversight, training, public 
engagement, and individual remedies are essential to remedy efforts by the 
shallow state and restore trust in the T visa program. In particular, this article 
recommends: (1) an investigation by the DHS Office of Inspector General 
(“OIG”), an independent body that can identify and address mismanagement, 
fraud, and abuse in DHS operations; (2) additional agency oversight by the Office 
of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (“Ombudsman”); (3) 
increased USCIS training and engagement; and (4) remedies for individuals 
harmed by unlawful USCIS policies. 
DHS OIG Investigation. An October 2020 report to Congress urged policy 
makers to investigate how barriers within the application process may be leading 
to “underutilization” of the T visa program.317 DHS OIG, thus, should respond by 
conducting a complete, thorough audit of the T visa application process.318 This 
audit process must evaluate any barriers that applicants face in accessing the T 
visa program. The audit should include a review of all correspondence among 
USCIS officials regarding these new policies and guidance, as well as interviews 
with USCIS officials and site visits with the USCIS Vermont Service Center, the 
office where T visa applications are decided.  
The audit should unearth any restrictive unlawful interpretations, such as 
the “on account of” standard. It should involve physical file reviews to compare 
case file information to determine compliance with statutory and regulatory 
guidance.319 At the conclusion of the investigation, OIG should provide 
 
315 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, REVIEW OF AND INTERIM REVISION TO CIVIL 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL POLICIES AND PRIORITIES 5 (Jan. 20, 2021). 
316 USCIS, USCIS CONFIRMS ELIMINATION OF “BLANK SPACE” CRITERIA (April 1, 2021), 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/uscis-confirms-elimination-of-blank-space-criteria 
[https://perma.cc/2NZP-T5R9]. 
317 IMMIGRATION RELIEF FOR VICTIMS, supra note 53, at 1. 
318 DHS is well-situated because it has the authority and experience engaging with USCIS 
related to human trafficking. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., ICE AND USCIS COULD 
IMPROVE DATA QUALITY AND EXCHANGE TO HELP IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING CASES, ( OIG-16-17 2016), 
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/2016/OIG-16-17-Jan16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BC74-FHVG] (conducting an audit examining how Immigrant & 
Customs Enforcement and USCIS could “improve data quality and exchange” to improve 
identification of trafficking cases). 
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recommendations for improving the T visa application process and addressing any 
harms identified associated with past unlawful policies. The OIG should report 
directly to Congress, which has the authority to address any obstacles identified 
legislatively or through other means. 
Agency Oversight. The USCIS Ombudsman also has authority to engage 
in oversight. The Ombudsman should identify any T visa applicants harmed by 
unlawful policies and recommend, in appropriate cases, to USCIS how to rectify 
any harms, especially of policies deemed unlawful by federal courts. For example, 
for applicants who had T visas improperly rejected due to the fee waiver and “no 
spaces” policy, the Ombudsman should move expeditiously to request that USCIS 
reinstate the initial date of receipt of the application. This move will ensure that 
the rejection does not delay the ultimate adjudication of their T visa application 
and will not negatively impact the eligibility of derivative family members.320  
Furthermore, the Ombudsman should encourage applicants who have 
received erroneous denials or requests for evidence to contact their office for 
review. If the adjudicatory practice is found to be unlawful, such as the “on 
account of” interpretation, the Ombudsman should assist applicants to refile or 
reopen their cases with USCIS. The Ombudsman also should investigate whether 
there is any evidence of gross misapplication of law. In such cases, the 
Ombudsman already has the power expeditiously to intervene with USCIS in 
individual cases and encourage that USCIS reopen such cases. Finally, the 
Ombudsman should report any findings related to the T visa application process 
in its annual report to Congress.  
Increased USCIS Training, Transparency, and Engagement. In addition, 
USCIS must improve training for adjudicators who decide T visa cases. 
Importantly, USCIS should institute annual, specialized training to the 
adjudicators assigned to adjudicating T visa claims. Currently, all T visa 
applications are decided by a specialized unit at the Vermont Service Center. It is 
essential that these officers receive additional training on: (1) existing statutory 
and regulatory requirements; (2) challenges that immigrant victims of trafficking 
may face when gathering evidence; (3) the “any credible evidence” requirement 
for immigrant victims applying for T visas; and (4) evolving federal case law 
interpreting relevant statutes and regulations relevant to trafficking. This regular, 
specialized training will ensure that officers are equipped to make consistent, 
lawful decisions.  
Moreover, USCIS should improve public transparency and accountability. 
USCIS must engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking as required by the APA 
for all new policies and provide stakeholders with an adequate opportunity to 
raise concerns early in the process. USCIS also should respond in a timely manner 
to FOIA Requests filed to obtain USCIS policies, guidance, and correspondence. 
In addition, the USCIS Vermont Service Center should increase engagement with 
the public, including immigrant victims, stakeholders, and advocates. USCIS 
 
320 For example, T visa applicants under 21 at time of filing may qualify for certain 
derivative family members, and thus, if the application is receipted in after the applicants 
21st birthday, the applicant may lose eligibility for certain family members. 
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should restart regular stakeholder calls. In such calls, USCIS should report 
regularly about data related to T visas, provide any updates in policies and trends, 
and respond directly to concerns from the public. This engagement helps to 
ensure that USCIS learns if new policies negatively impact T visa applicants. 
Individual Remedies. Finally, it is essential that T visa applicants harmed 
by these policies have available remedies. For those who successfully bring 
federal lawsuits, a federal court may order relief to either individual(s) or class 
members harmed by the policy.321 However, many impacted immigrant victims 
may be difficult to reach, fearful, and without legal representation.322 Thus, 
USCIS should consider affirmative ways to identify and assist any immigrant 
victims negatively impacted by unlawful practices.  
Remedies include reinstating the initial filing date of any applications that 
were rejected unlawfully by the fee waiver or “no spaces” policy. If a federal 
court were to find that the “on account of” interpretation violates the INA, 
applicants harmed by this interpretation should be permitted to reopen their T visa 
applications and associated waiver applications without cost. In addition, any 
erroneously denied T visa applicants who were deported from the United States 
should be permitted to file a motion to reopen with the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review based on equitable tolling. Also, unlawfully denied T visa 
applicants with final orders of removal should be granted an automatic stay of 
removal and be able to qualify for a motion to reopen based on the agency’s 
erroneous interpretation.323 While exceptional measures, these measures are 
important to ensure that no further harm occurs to immigrant victims, and to 




In October 28, 2020, a report to members of Congress took note of the 
underutilization of the T visa program.324 It encouraged policy makers to 
investigate how elements of the application process “impede victims from 
applying for T status or create difficulties for victims.”325 As this article has 
shown, policies of the “shallow state” have erected new barriers in the T visa 
 
321 See supra Part II.C.2. 
322 Krystin Roehl & Logan Schmidt, The Shocking Lack of Due Process for Immigrants, 
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE (2020), https://www.vera.org/blog/target-2020/the-shocking-
lack-of-due-process-for-immigrants [https://perma.cc/7BDD-9U8Q] (describing the 
profound lack of access to pro bono representation for immigrant victims). 
323 Equitable tolling is a concept that allows an applicant to file a motion to reopen after 
the relevant statute of limitations if they did not discover the circumstances giving rise to 
the claim until after the filing deadline has passed. If the agency engaged in an unlawful 
policy or interpretation that resulted in the denial, the applicant should automatically 
qualify for a motion to reopen based on equitable tolling. 
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process. These obstacles are diffuse and often hidden. These policies have acted, 
at times, as “minefields” to trap the vulnerable and expose them to deportation. 
They have done lasting harm to applicants and to the legitimacy of the T visa 
program.  
The harms of the past four years cannot be undone swiftly. A new 
Administration must not only roll back such policies but also engage in a careful, 
comprehensive examination of any barriers within the T visa program. These 
efforts to unearth the shallow state must be accompanied by engagement, 
oversight, and transparency to restore trust and ensure that the T visa program 
remains viable. They must also be swiftly and publicly. Only such quick action 
will restore trust and ensure that victims will step out of the shadows to take a 
chance on their own protection. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3860845
